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LORETTA W. MOORE*, DAVID E. PIERCE**

A Structural Model for Arbitrating,
Disputes Under the Oil and Gas Lease
ABSTRACT
Nearly all oil andgas in the United States is developed under some
form of oil and gas lease. The resultinglessor/lessee relationshipis
frequently put under stress by conflicts that are inherent to the
relationship.Foralmost a century the oil and gas lease has been the
source of extensive litigation to address conflicts that appear to be
an inseparablepart of the lease relationship.The primary dispute
resolution techniques currently employed to resolve lease disputes
are informal negotiation and litigation. The oil and gas lease
relationship can be improved by incorporating into the lease
document a pre-dispute arbitration clause which requires the
exhaustion offormal negotiationand mediation processes prior to
arbitration. Sample contract language and arbitrationrules are
provided as drafting prototypes to assist in evaluating the
arbitrationalternativefor addressingoil andgas lease disputes. The
development ofan arbitrationalternativealso demonstratesthe need
for the creationof an organizationthat specializes in administering
dispute resolutionprocessesfor the oil and gas industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps it is time to quit trying to draft the optimum oil and gas
lease.' Instead, it may be more beneficial to focus our drafting efforts on

* Loretta W. Moore is a Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law. BA.,
Park College, 1975, J.D., Washington University School of Law, 1978.
** David E. Pierce is a Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law. B.A.,
Pittsburg State University, 1974, J.D., Washburn University School of Law, 1977, LLM. (Energy

Law), University of Utah College of Law, 1982.
1. Several articles have addressed ways to improve upon the express terms of the oil
and gas lease. See, e.g., Owen L Anderson, David v. Goliath.Negotiating the "Lessor's 88" and
Representing Lessors and Surface Owners in Oil and Gas Lease Plays, 275 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L
INST. 1029 (1982); Edwin M. Cage, The Modem Oil and Gas Lease-A Faceliftfor Old 88,31 INT.
ON OIL & GAS L & TAx'N 177 (1980); James N. Castleberry, Jr., Protectingthe Oil and Gas Lessor,
30 ROCKY MTN. L Ray. 441 (1958); Hinton, NegotiatingOil and Gas Leasafor the Lessor, 1 NAT.
RSuXcS& ENV'T 7 (1985); John S. Lowe, NegotiatingOil and Gas Leasesfor the Lessee, 1 NAT.
RsouRcEs &ENv'T 6(1985); John S. Lowe, Representing the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leasing
Transactions, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1978); Thomas W. Lynch, The "Perfect" Oil and Gas Lease
(An Oxymoron), 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 3-1 (1994); Maurice H. Merrill, The Oil and Gas
Lease-MajorProblems,41 NEB. L REv. 488 (1962); Ronald D. Nickum, Negotiatingand Drafting
a Modern Oil and Gas Lease on Behalf of Lessor, 13 TEX. TEC. L REV. 1401 (1982); Bernard E.
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efficient dispute resolution techniques 2 to manage the discord that appears
to be an inseparable part of the lease relationship.3 If disputes between
parties to the lease are inevitable,4 an internal dispute resolution mechanism
may improve the relationship more than another round of royalty clause
tinkering.
After evaluating the various types of dispute resolution techniques,
this article explores the role arbitration can play in resolving oil and gas
lease disputes.' In an effort to define the possible contours of a structural

Nordling, Landowner'sViewpoints in PipelineRight-of-Way and Oil and Gas Lease Negotiations,
52J. KAN. B.A. 35 (1983); David E. Pierce, Incorporatinga Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
Into the "M odern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WAsHBURN L.J. 786 (1994).
2. The authors view the "ADR"process as a search for the Appropriate Dispute
Resolution technique, not necessarily an Alternative technique. See generally Ann L.
MacNaughton, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1996) (discussing the process of developing
mappropriate dispute resolution strategies).
3. See David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445
(1987)(identifying the inherent conflicts associated with the "standard' oil and gas lease
relationship).
4. As Professor Merrill noted in 1958:
In contrast [to coal leases), the oil and gas lease seems to have been in a
state of constant change throughout the history of the industry. Its
evolution and its interpretation have been and continue to be subjects of
discussion in law review articles and at legal institutes. Modifications of old
clauses, and new provisions, designed to deal with thorny issues or
currently developing problems, appear in abundance. In the West
Publishing Company's Sixth Decennial Digest, fourteen pages are occupied
by the paragraphs giving access to cases involving the construction and
operation of mining leases dealing with all sorts of minerals except oil and
gas. In contrast, the construction and operation of oil and gas leases require
seventy-three pages. This difference is significant of the greater diversity
of the problems arising in this one field.
MAURICE H. MEmmuL THs PuouC'S CONCERN WITHHE FUEL MINERALS 21-22 (1960) (footnotes
omitted). See also Pierce, supra note 3, at 456 n.54. In addition to the substantial degree of
variance in lease language, Professor Pierce has observed that: "[T]he nature of the
relationship, and the large amounts of money often at stake, guarantee that disputes will
arise even under the most artfully crafted documents. Under the current form of oil and gas
lease either party can seek their pound of flesh in court.' Pierce, supra note 1, at 787 n.3.
5. For an excellent analysis of the role mediation can play in resolving oil and gas lease
disputes, see Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas Lease and ADR: A MarriageMade in Heaven Waiting
to Happen, 30 TULSA L.J. 599 (1995). Professor Shade offers the following suggested form of
compulsory mediation clause:
Prior to instituting litigation, the parties will attempt in good faith to
resolve any controversy or claim arising out of, in connection with or
relating to this lease by mediation. Such mediation will be conducted by a
mediator chosen by agreement of the parties or duly appointed by the
American Arbitration Association in accordance with the Commercial
Mediation Rules of such association then in effect. The cost of mediation
shall be shared equally by the lessor and lessee. If the matter has not been
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model for arbitrating oil and gas disputes, sample contract language and
arbitration rules have been prepared. 6 The goal is to address the relevant
issues by providing readers with tangible drafting prototypes that will
assist future discourse on this subject.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES
It is difficult to compile an accurate list of dispute resolution
techniques. Recognizing that the law is, to a large extent, merely a conflict
resolution process, clients and their counsel are fashioning, on a daily basis,
new ways to resolve conflict! However, it is useful to analyze dispute
resolution techniques by first determining whether they are designed to
take the final decision-making process out of the control of the parties. If
they do, they are often referred to as "decisional" techniques! An example
of a decisional dispute resolution technique is arbitration.' Once the process
is triggered, a decision will be rendered by the arbitrator. 0 If the ultimate
decision-making process remains under the control of the parties," the
dispute resolution technique is "non-decisional" with the goal of
"facilitating" a resolution of the dispute by the parties.12

resolved pursuant to the aforesaid mediation procedure within sixty days
of the commencement of such procedure (which period may be extended
by mutual agreement), either party may initiate litigation.
Shade, supraat 645.
6. See infra Appendix A (contract language) and Appendix B (arbitration rules).
7. Professor Dauer has observed:
The catalogue of dispute resolution procedures is far from closed.... A
major hallmark of ADR is its flexibility. Unlike the more established forms
that prevail in litigation, almost every aspect of almost every kind of ADR
can be varied to almost any degree to suit the special needs of the
individual case.... The needs of the parties and the characteristics of the
problem should describe the contours of the process, not anything that
comes from strict adherence to a conventional form.
I EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISWuTi RSOLMON 5.1, 5-2 to 5-3 (1995) (footnote

omitted).
8. Id. at 5-3. Decisional techniques are also referred to as 'adjudicative" techniques.
CENTER FOR PuBuc REsouRcEs, MODEL ADR PRocsDus iN TECHNOLOGY DWuTEs 7 (1993).
9. Litigation is also a decisional technique.
10. This assumes, as is the case with litigation, the parties are unable to voluntarily
settle their dispute prior to a final ruling.
11. The primary "decisione will be whether to pursue a judicial remedy.
12. 1 DAUER, supra note 7, at 5-3. Non-decisional techniques are also referred to as
"consensual" or "non-adjudicatory' techniques.' CEN
FOR Pusuc RESOURCES, supra note
8, at 2.
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The two general categories of techniques can be combined, and
frequently are, 3 by requiring a formalized exhaustion of various nondecisional techniques before the dispute becomes ripe for application of a
decisional technique. For example, although the focus of this article is on the
use of a decisional technique, arbitration, the sample rules offered for
discussion require the parties to exhaust two non-decisional techniques
before they can pursue the arbitration remedy. The sample rules require the
parties, once the "arbitration" process is triggered, to first exhaust a
structured negotiation process and, failing agreement after negotiation,
pursue mediation. 4 Under the sample rules these techniques are triggered
as part of the "arbitration" process to effectively develop the essential
13. See, e.g., Joseph W. Morris, The Viability ofAlternative DisputeResolution in the Oil and
Gas Industry, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 14-1,14-24 (1993) (discussing a two step dispute
resolution clause recommended by the Center for Public Resources/CPR Legal Program
employing optional mediation/arbitration, mediation/litigation, minitrial/arbitration, or
minitrial/litigation approaches). However, this does not refer to the process of "Med-Arb"
when the same neutral acts as a mediator and then, if the matter is not resolved, functions
as the arbitrator. See Karen L. Henry, Med-Arb: An Alternative to Interest Arbitrationin the
Resolution of ContractNegotiation Disputes,3 OHIO ST. J. oN DISp.RB5OL. 385,389 (1988).
14. Rule 4 of the sample rules provides, in part:
4. Party Discussions and Mediation. Upon receipt of the Reply, each party,
will identify someone in their organization that has the decision-making
authority to grant the remedy sought by the other party(ies).... Each party
will notify the Institute of their selected decision-maker on or before the
tenth day following receipt of all party Replies .... The Institute will then
coordinate a meeting in which the selected decision-makers will confer
face-to-face with one another in an effort to resolve their differences. The
meeting shall take place on or before the thirtieth day following each
party's selection of a decision-maker. The meeting will be at a date, time,
and location agreed to by the parties; if the parties are unable to agree, the
date, time, and location of the meeting will be designated by the Institute.
If the parties are able to resolve some or all of their differences, they will
enter into a Joint Stipulation that identifies the dispute they have resolved,
and whether any dispute remains that requires further arbitration. The
Joint Stipulation will be filed with the Institute. If matters remain unresolved following the meeting, the Institute will give the parties a ten-day
period in which to agree upon the selection of a mediator to work with the
parties in an effort to resolve their remaining differences. If the parties are
unable to agree upon a mediator within the ten-day period, the Institute
will appoint the mediator. Upon identification of the mediator, the Institute
will forward to the mediator a copy of the Arbitration Notice, the Arbitration Notice Reply(ies), and any Joint Stipulations. The mediation will be
commenced on or before the forty-fifth day following the meeting of
decision-makers. If the parties are able to resolve some or all of their differences, they will enter into a Joint Stipulation that identifies the dispute(s)
they have resolved, and whether any dispute remains that requires further
arbitration. The Joint Stipulation will be filed with the Institute.
See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
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written information, at the negotiation/mediation phase of the process, to
facilitate voluntary resolution of the dispute. Since the same written
information will be used in the arbitration process if the non-decisional
techniques fail, the parties have a built-in incentive to properly characterize
the dispute at the negotiation/mediation phase.
Once the decisional/non-decisional categories are established, it is
often helpful to further classify possible dispute resolution alternatives by
associating them with one of the following generally recognized types of
dispute resolution techniques: negotiation, mediation, minitrial, and arbitration. However, as noted previously, these classifications are more for
historical and descriptive reference as opposed to defining what is possible.
This is truly an area where the only real limitations are those imposed by
the level of dispute resolution knowledge and creativity of the parties.
A. Negotiation
Lawyers routinely negotiate some or all aspects of their clients' disputes." The major downside of negotiation, compared to other non-decisional techniques, is its adversarial nature. Part of the negotiation process
inevitably includes posturing and positioning in the event the dispute is not
resolved. Negotiations may break down, particularly where they are
approached in a competitive, as opposed to a cooperative, mode.17
Although over 90 percent of all lawsuits filed are settled through
negotiation, 8 it is safe to assume that 100 percent of the lawsuits that
actually go to trial represent failed attempts to negotiate a dispute.

15. Another general category would be the "court-annexed' dispute resolution
techniques that are imposed by a court to try and facilitate settlement. Although the precise
processes are dictated by statute, court rule, or court order, they will typically employ some
form of non-decisional dispute resolution technique. See also Bruce S. Marks, Commercial
Conflict Managementand Alternative DisputeResolution in the Oil and Gas Industry,41 INsT. OIL
& GAs L &TAX'N 9-1,9-63 To 9-68 (1990). See generally 1DAuER, supranote 7, at 5-11 to 5-19.
16. The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct identifies several roles
played by lawyers: advisor, advocate, intermediary, evaluator, and "negotiator.' The
Preamble states, in part: 'As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client

but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others.' MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONVUCr Preamble (1983).

17. In many instances the "successful' negotiation does not take place until the eve of
trial when many of the benefits of an early resolution of the dispute have been lost. Jay F.

Lapin & Roger

J. Patterson, Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Strategiesfor Litigation and

Settlement of Legal Claims,40 INST. ON OIL & GAsL & TAX'N 6-1,6-4 (1989).
18. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L REv. 4,28
(1983) (study by the Civil Litigation Research Project indicated about 88% of the civil cases
in the ten courts studied were settled while only 9% went to trial). More recent studies
indicate that only 5%of all cases filed go to trial. 1 DAuER, supra note 7, at 4-20.
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When a dispute arises the lawyer often becomes the key actor in the
negotiation process with their client at the periphery. The tendency is often
to "turn it over to the lawyers" once it is apparent the matter cannot be
resolved through ordinary business channels. The lawyers then attempt to
hammer out a settlement within the general confines of their clients'
authority.
However, the resulting settlement may not maximally serve the
interests of all the parties. Client dissatisfaction with the settlement may
result in attempts to circumvent the settlement through self-serving
interpretation or outright refusal to perform. If the settlement results in a
perceived "winner" and "loser," the losing party will have an incentive to
avoid the settlement terms whenever possible.
Negotiation will often require access to information which the other
side is unwilling to provide. Unless the parties can effectively negotiate a
resolution of these information issues, litigation will be triggered to obtain
the discovery a party deems necessary before meaningful negotiation can
take place. Therefore, negotiators must navigate around numerous
discovery issues that can become litigation triggers.19
Although negotiation has inherent flaws, it should, and will, be
pursued in about every sort of dispute. The sample arbitration rules offered
by the authors are designed to ensure a controlled form of negotiation is
pursued in every dispute that has been noticed for arbitration.20 The
"Arbitration Notice" and "Arbitration Notice Reply" will set out in writing
the relevant facts, law, positions, and demands of each party. For example,
Rule 2 provides, in part:
The Arbitration Notice will contain the following information:
a. A description of the dispute(s) giving rise to the
arbitration proceedings;
b. A statement indicating why the matter is subject to
arbitration under the lease arbitration clause;
c. A statement of the relevant facts necessary to resolve the
dispute;
d. A statement of the relevant law necessary to resolve the
dispute;
e. A statement of the relief sought by the party (if seeking a
sum of money, the specific amount alleged to be due and the
details of the calculation must be included); and

19. Each party's quest for information to make their case, and to improve their
bargaining position, also explains why successful negotiations often take place late in the
dispute resolution process. See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
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f. An appendix containing copies of all relevant documents,
cases, statutes, and other written material relevant to the
decision of the dispute.'
Since these documents will serve as significant decisional
documents for the arbitrator, there is an incentive for each party to be frank,
fair, and accurate in their assertions. Therefore, for these same reasons, the
information required by the Arbitration Notice and Reply will also be useful
during the negotiation phase of the arbitration.
The negotiation process contained in the sample rules is structured
to try and insulate the process, to the extent possible, from any pre-existing
hostilities between the parties. Another goal is to try and eliminate the
"ego" factor from the negotiations.' In this regard, the sample rules
provide:
Whenever possible: (1) the decision-maker who is identified
should have no prior contact with the dispute triggering the
arbitration; and (2) they should be from outside the particular
department or business unit that has responsibility for the
particular lease involved. '
In the lessor/lessee context, this means the lessor will typically be
acting on their own behalf with the lessee being represented by a decisionmaker from another business unit that has had no prior contact with the
dispute. 24 To ensure all parties come to the negotiating table armed with
authority to settle, the sample rules provide:
Where a party is an organization, the decision-maker's
authority to act should be stated in a properly executed
power of attorney designating the decision-maker as the
organization's attorney-in-fact with actual authority to agree
to the remedy sought by the other party. '

21.

See infra Appendix B, Rule 2 (Arbitration Notice), Rule 3 (Arbitration Notice Reply).

22. The design is to place the parties in a position to engage in "collaborative"
negotiation with the mutual goal of solving the problems giving rise to the dispute. See
generally 1 DAUER, supranote 7, § 4.06.
23. See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
24. This could also aid the informal negotiation process since the manager of the

business unit giving rise to the "problem" may be reluctant to have the matter reviewed by
someone else in the company. Too often the personnel directly involved with the dispute are
also the people who argue for litigation to vindicate their personal position, or ego, without

considering what is best for the organization. After all, if the organization is going to pay for
it, why not insist upon unlimited litigation? Often the personnel directly involved with the
dispute are also the people who hire, and fire, the lawyers who will litigate the dispute.

Attorneys in this situation should remember that under Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
25. See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
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To ensure the parties approach the non-decisional processes of
negotiation and mediation with the same commitment as the stand-by
decisional process of arbitration, the sample rules provide:
If the arbitrator determines that any party failed, in good
faith, to comply with the procedures outlined in § 4 of these
Rules, the arbitrator shall assess Institute expenses, mediator
costs, and party expenses (including travel expenses, lost
work time, attorney fees, and any other loss that the party can
demonstrate arose out of the other party's failure to
participate) against the non-complying party. The parties
recognize that a failure to pursue the informal proceedings
provided for by these Rules can give rise to unnecessary
expenses and loss of productivity that is difficult to value.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator will endeavor to fully compensate
the complying party to the maximum extent possible. 26
The process is structured so that if a party fails to pursue
negotiation and mediation in good faith, the dispute will ultimately be
presented to the arbitrator. In addition to deciding the dispute, the
arbitrator, under Rule 9, will also have the obligation to address any bad
faith practiced by a party during the non-decisional phases of the process.27
B. Mediation
Mediation is perhaps the most popular form of non-decisional
dispute resolution. The disputing parties are the active participants in
mediation. Depending upon the selected process, the parties' lawyers may,

26. See infra Appendix B, Rule 9.
27. In the first portion of Rule 9 the arbitrator is given the "discretion to assess another
party's attorney fees, and any other expense associated with the arbitration process, against
any other party." The second portion of Rule 9 indicates the arbitrator "shall assess...
expenses... against the non-complying party" when they fai, in good faith, to comply with
negotiation and mediation procedures. Under the sample rules, the arbitrator could
conceivably rule in favor of a party on the merits but assess attorney fees and expenses
against the prevailing party because they failed to participate in the non-decisional processes
that might have eliminated the need for the arbitration phase of the proceeding. See infra
Appendix B, Rule 9. To limit the ability of a recalcitrant party to abuse the dispute resolution
process, Rule 5 provides for the appointment of the arbitrator at any time the Executive
Director of the Institute determines the situation warrants an arbitrator's direction. Rule 5
provides, in part:
The Executive Director of the Institute, during any phase of the dispute
resolution procedures provided for by these Rules, may trigger selection of
an arbitrator whenever it becomes apparent to the Executive Director an
arbitrator is needed to manage the process.
See infra Appendix B, Rule 5.
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or may not, be present during the mediation. The process employs a neutral
party, the "mediator," who may be an attorney or some other specially
trained or experienced person. Unlike arbitration, the mediator has no
decision-making role and cannot impose a solution on the parties. Instead,
the mediator serves as a facilitator for the parties, enabling them to conduct
open communication regarding their interests, concerns, and options for
resolving their dispute. The parties work out their own settlement
agreement which they can make binding or non-binding.3
Party satisfaction in the mediation process can be quite high. The
process allows the parties to vent their anger, feelings, hostilities, and fears
in a "controlled" process. 2' The parties are permitted to work through all
aspects of their dispute which typically means any resulting settlement
agreement will enjoy a high level of compliance. 3°
Parties typically find the mediation process more manageable
because they can control the time and money that is spent pursuing
mediation. The primary costs are the mediator's hourly fee and the time
required of the parties to prepare for and participate in the mediation. The
process is private, and the parties can agree to whatever level of
confidentiality they desire.31 The net effect tends to strengthen relationships
that would otherwise be irretrievably damaged by the litigation process.
When dealing with oil and gas lease disputes, where the underlying
relationship can last for decades, promoting harmony that preserves a
functioning long-term relationship should be a major consideration? 2
Mediation, however, has its faults. First, the parties must be willing
to mediate; they must approach the process in good faith.' Either party

28. See generally 1 DAuEK supra note 7, at § 11.11.
29. Id. at 11-32.
30. Shade, supranote 5, at 619.
31. 1 DAUma, supra note 7, at 11-32.
32. Shade, supra note 5, at 621.
33. The authors' sample arbitration rules allow the arbitrator to assess a wide range of
costs against the party who fails to pursue mediation in good faith. See supra text
accompanying note 26. See infra Appendix B,Rule 9. This is another reason why the informal
non-decisional processes are pursued as part of the arbitration process: the parties will
ultimately have an arbitrator that can determine disputes and impose appropriate sanctions
when necessary. Rule 4 empowers the mediator to terminate the mediation and make a
finding that a party is not pursuing the process in good faith, thereby triggering the
appointment of an arbitrator. Rule 4 provides, in part:

Ifthe mediator determines that a party is not participating in the mediation
process in good faith, the mediator can terminate the mediation by
delivering to the Institute the following document titled 'Termination

Statement":
TERMINATION STATEMENT

This mediation is being terminated because the mediator does not believe
that [name of party(s)] is (are) participating in the mediation process in
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could easily attempt to use mediation as another discovery device or to
verbally abuse or intimidate a weaker party. Either party might arbitrarily
terminate the mediation. Even in cases where mediation is pursued in good
faith, there is always the risk that the parties' efforts will result in an
impasse. In these situations the parties will have added another layer of
time and expense to the process of resolving their dispute. However, even
a failed mediation effort can be of value by better defining the true nature
of the dispute between the parties.
Another disadvantage to mediation is that most mediated
agreements are not self-enforcing' Unless the mediated dispute is already
the subject of pending litigation, there is no procedural mechanism by
which the agreement can become an enforceable court order. If a party
defaults on the mediated agreement, the non-defaulting party must initiate
a court proceeding to establish the existence of the contractual obligation,
the party's breach, and the appropriate remedy. The defaulting party may
raise typical contract defenses such as duress, fraud, and unconscionability.
The availability of the mediator as a witness in such proceedings is
questionable. Some jurisdictions exclude mediators and their records from
the subpoena process. Statutes and court rules establishing mediator
privilege and confidentiality may be available that prevent the mediator
from testifying about communications and information received during the
mediation process. Therefore, neither party may be able to rely on the
mediator for support in enforcement proceedings.35
The sample rules prepared by the authors attempt to address the
enforcement problem by making the negotiation and mediation processes part
of the arbitration process. Arbitration proceedings are commenced by serving

good faith.
[Signed by Mediator]
Upon receipt of the mediator's Termination Statement, the Institute will
proceed with selection of an arbitrator pursuant to section 5. The Institute
will provide the arbitrator with a copy of the mediator's Termination
Statement which, for purposes of section 9, will be conclusive on the issue
of the party's lack of good faith during the mediation process. Under no
circumstances will the mediator be called by the parties, or the arbitrator,
to be a witness, or otherwise provide information or testimony in any form,
regarding the mediation. The only evidence the parties can present, or the
arbitrator request, concerning the terminated mediation process, is
evidence that will assist the arbitrator in calculating the amount necessary
to fully compensate the complying party as required by section 9.
34. Lapin & Patterson, supranote 17, at 6-32 to 6-33.
35. 2 EDWARD A. DALum MANUALOF Disu RESOLuoN § 22.07 (1995). Professor Dauer
discusses the trend of states enacting ADR privilege statutes, but cautions that each statute
must be carefully reviewed to ensure the activity comes within its protection. Id. at 22-27 to
22-28. See generally Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer Mediators:Meeting the Ethical Challenges,30 FAM.
L.Q. 679,700-09 (1996) (discussing state law restrictions on mediator disclosure).
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an Arbitration Notice on all other parties.? The negotiation and mediation
processes must take place once each party has served their Arbitration Notice
Reply. 7 If negotiation or mediation is successful, a Joint Stipulation will be
entered into by the parties and filed with the administering organization. If
all disputes are resolved between the parties, the Joint Stipulation will state
that the current "Executive Director of the Oil & Gas Dispute Resolution
Institute" is selected as the parties' designated arbitrator for the sole purpose
3
of entering an award in accordance with the terms of the Joint Stipulation.
The goal is to clothe the negotiated or mediated settlement agreement with
the enforceability of an arbitration award.3
C. Minitrial
The minitrial involves the presentation of an abbreviated version
of each party's case to a panel consisting of a senior executive officer for
each disputant and a neutral advisor.' The goal is to provide the executives
with an opportunity to hear the best case each side has to offer while

See infra Appendix B, Rule 2 which provides, in part:
2. Commencement of Arbitration Proceedings. A party commences
arbitration proceedings by serving an Arbitration Notice on all other
parties to the lease, serving an Arbitration Notice on the Institute (3 copies),
and paying the Institute the filing fee required by § 11 of these Rules.
37. See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
38. The Oil & Gas Dispute Resolution Institute is a fictitious organization, at this time.
One goal of this article is to demonstrate how formation of such an organization could assist
the resolution of oil and gas industry disputes. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
Rule 4 provides, in part:
Any Joint Stipulation that resolves all disputes between the parties will
name the current Executive Director of the Institute as the parties' selected
arbitrator for the sole purpose of issuing an award that incorporates the
terms of the Joint Stipulation. Upon issuing the award incorporating the
Joint Stipulation, the arbitration will terminate.
See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
39. Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides, in part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon an award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in section
10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties,
then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the
36.

district within which such award was made. ...
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
40. See generally Morris, supra note 13, at 14-15 to 14-16 (describing the origin and
attributes of the minitrial).
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providing the information, and the environment, to try and negotiate a
resolution of the dispute. It is a non-decisional technique which is best
suited to situations where there are complex issues of law and fact and the
parties on each side of the dispute are sophisticated industry equals.4 It is
a private process which requires the active participation of the senior
executive officers of each business entity.'
Prior to the date of the mini-trial, each party's lawyer will establish
the date and site of the minitrial. They will agree upon a schedule for
completion of discovery and exchange of information; they will agree on the
procedural rules that will be followed during the minitrial and they will
select a third party neutral. The senior executive officers for each party must
be present throughout the minitrial so they can personally hear each party's
case. The third party neutral will also be present throughout the
proceedings. The neutral is often a lawyer but in all cases will be someone
who possesses expertise in the subject matter of the dispute. The parties will
typically agree to share the fees and expenses of the advisor. The minitrial
may take from one to five days.'
Lawyers representing each party will provide a summary of their
party's "best case" on the disputed issues. They may present documentary
exhibits and affidavits but no sworn testimony is taken. The rules of
evidence are relaxed. After all sides have given their summary presentation,
the executives meet in a separate conference room to engage in negotiations
to try and settle the dispute. If they are unable to resolve the dispute, they
may receive a written non-binding opinion from the third party neutral
regarding the neutral's assessment of the case and likely outcome at trial.
With that additional information, the executives may meet again in an
attempt to negotiate a settlement." In some cases where the executives are
unable to initially resolve the dispute they may, at that time, agree to allow
the third party neutral advisor to issue a binding decision. Regardless of the

41. Id.
42. In the corporate setting, many disputes can be resolved, or avoided, if upper level
executives are brought into the process at the appropriate time; which in almost all cases will
be "sooner" rather than "later." The key is for lower level employees, and the legal counsel
that represent the company, to know when in the dispute process to seek upper level
executive input. Often times a dispute gets solved merely because the dispute resolution
process requires the involvement of upper level personnel. Too often, however, the dispute
has already languished for months or years before an external force, such as a court order
or a structured dispute resolution process, forces the detached big-picture decision makers
to get involved. A major improvement in internal corporate management would be to
establish a system to actively involve upper level executives in resolving disputes at a much
earlier stage of the process when a telephone call to an equally senior executive on the other
side of the dispute may be all that is required.
43. See generally Morris, supra note 13, at 14-5 to 14-7.
44. Id. at 14-6 to 14-7.
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precise process followed, settlement of disputes by minitrial often occurs
because the parties with decision-making authority are actively involved in
the process.'5
D.

Arbitration

Arbitration is a decisional dispute resolution technique in which
both the parties and their lawyers play an active role.' Unless the parties
are able to voluntarily resolve their dispute, it will be resolved by the
arbitrator.'7 The arbitration technique can be selected at the time the
contract or relationship is created.' This is accomplished through a predispute arbitration clause that is included in the contract, or by a separate
agreement between the parties prior to the existence of a dispute. 9
The parties typically play a major role in selecting the arbitrator
who will serve as the neutral decision-maker. This allows the parties to
select people who possess knowledge and experience regarding the subject
matter of the dispute. The parties also have the flexibility to define the
procedures that will be followed, such as discovery and the presentation of
evidence. The dispute resolution process can be tailored by the parties to
address the specific needs of their business relationship. Arbitration,
compared to litigation, is generally faster, less expensive, confidential, and
enables the decision-maker to focus on the details of the dispute while
taking into account the customs and practices of the industry.'
However, many of the advantages of arbitration can also be cited
as disadvantages. For example, limitations on discovery, perceptions
concerning the qualifications and disposition of the arbitrator, and limited
judicial review can all be viewed from varying perspectives.' Typically
these are viewed as advantages when talking about disputes in the abstract;
they become disadvantages only in specific cases when one party feels they
might have fared better in court' 2 There are also what have been termed
"illusory advantages" where arbitration becomes as complex, cumbersome,

45. See supranote 42.
46. RoBERTCouLsoNBusNARBrrRATioN-WHATYOUNuv TOKNOW15(4th ed. 1991).
47. Id. at 8.

48. Id.at 16-17.
49. Parties who do not have a pre-dispute arbitration agreement can always agree to
arbitrate existing disputes. The Federal ArbitrationAct applies to pre-dispute arbitration

agreements and "an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
....
"9U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
50. See generally Doak Bishop, Arbitration qf Oil and Gas Disputes:Recent Developments and
Innovative Techniques, 47 INSr. ON OIL & GAS L.& TAX'N 5-1, 5-3 to 5-4 (1996) (listing
advantages and disadvantages of arbitration).

51. Id.at 5-4.
52. James K. Brown &John Philip Melick, The ArbitrationAlternativefor VariousCoal, Oil,

and Gas Non-Labor Disputes,5EKMIN.L INST. 1-1,1-9 (1984).
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and costly as litigation with the additional risk of intermediate trips to court
to litigate whether a particular matter is subject to arbitration.' Fortunately,
these disadvantages can be managed or avoided by the parties, if they so
choose, in their arbitration agreement.' One disadvantage of arbitration the
parties cannot change is its inherently adversarial nature. Although the
process can be made more humane than litigation, it is still a process where
each party is trying to convince a decision-maker about the correctness of
their position. The authors, in an attempt to obtain the benefits of
negotiation and mediation while ensuring a final decision will be made outof-court if conciliatory efforts fail, have provided for a three phase dispute
resolution procedure employing structured negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration.'
Of all the various dispute resolution techniques, arbitration has the
strongest "legal" foundation with the validating force of the Federal
Arbitration Act, ' state statutes, 7 and a host of United States Supreme Court
cases lauding, M and promoting, arbitration agreements. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, the only limits on the parties' ability to engage in the
private ordering of their dispute resolution affairs are the traditional limits

53. Id.
54. For example, the authors have sought to avoid the arbitrability issue by making
virtually any characterization of a lease dispute issue a matter for arbitration. See infra text

accompanying notes 89-95.
55.
56.

See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides, in part:
A written provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
57. For example, New Mexico statutes provides, in part:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy

thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of

any contract....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-1 (Michie 1996)

58. E.g., Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2328 (1995)
(noting the value of arbitration in promoting 'contemporary principles of international
comity and commercial practice').
59. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839
(interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act broadly to cover any contract 'affecting
commerce").
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imposed on all contractual arrangements?° and the ability to effectively
express their intent in writing.61

III. THE OIL AND GAS LEASE RELATIONSHIP
To fashion the appropriate dispute resolution process for a business
relationship, counsel, and their clients, must consider: the parties involved,
their business goals, the disputes they commonly encounter, the traditional
mode of dealing with disputes, and their goals in seeking a more
appropriate way for dealing with disputes.' Each of these considerations
play a role in defining the dispute resolution techniques that should be

60. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of arbitration
agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). In Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto the Supreme Court noted
that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2." Doctor's Assoc.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652,1656 (1996).
61. The ability to arbitrate depends upon the parties' agreement. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act courts will read agreements to arbitrate liberally to resolve any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
62. If the client does not raise the alternative dispute resolution issue, the lawyer, as
part of her counseling process, should. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
requires: "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.4(b) (1983). The comment to Rule 1.4 states: "The client
should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued...." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.4 cmt. (1983). Today when a dispute arises the
lawyer's communication role under Rule 1.4 would seem to include exploring alternative
dispute resolution techniques with the client. How else could the client, ignorant about
possible alternatives to litigation, make "informed decisions" concerning their
representation in a disputed matter? A more difficult question is defining the lawyer's role
in suggesting possible dispute resolution techniques at the pre-dispute drafting stage of
representation. Certainly we are at that stage of development from a "business" point of
view, even though it may not yet be an ethical obligation. The Colorado Supreme Court has
addressed the issue under Rule 2.1 Advisor by adding the following language to Rule 2.1:
In a matter involving, or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer shall
advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might
reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute, or to reach
the legal objective sought.
COLD. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 2.1 (1993). See generally I.ONARD L RSU & JAMS E.
WwTBROOK, DISPUTE RESoLuON AND LAwyE 4-8 (Supp. 1993) (addressing dispute
resolution counseling obligations and the Colorado approach to the issue).
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employed and the procedural details that will govern the parties' dispute
resolution rights and obligations.'
A. The Parties
The oil and gas lease relationship presents a unique dispute
resolution challenge because the parties to the relationship can be so varied.
However, in most leasing situations there will be one party, the lessor, who
will often lack sophistication concerning oil and gas contracts and the oil
and gas development process." Typically lessors are individuals that also
own the land being leased, or they own only the mineral interest in the
land.65 On the other side of the transaction is the lessee which usually has
much more information and expertise concerning the subject matter of the
leasing transaction. Although the term "lessee" is typically associated with
an "oil company," it may also be a single individual, such as a geologist,
attempting to lease an area so it can be packaged, sold, and assigned to an
oil company." However, the lease will typically end up in the possession of
an oil company which has expertise in oil and gas development. Therefore,
the prototype lease relationship is an individual lessor with a more
sophisticated oil and gas business organization as lessee.
B. Business Goals of the Parties
1. Lessor
The lessor's main business goal under the oil and gas lease is to
obtain the risk-free development of the mineral potential of their property.
63. Several commentators have provided detailed guidance on how to diagnose
relationships to define the dispute resolution techniques that might be appropriate for the
parties to the relationship. E.g., 1 DAUER supra note 7, at § 6.01; Lapin & Patterson supra note
17, at 6-28 to 6-30; Shade supra note 5, at 620-28.
64. This is not always the case. Many lessors in areas that have been extensively
developed for oil and gas are very sophisticated and, perhaps more importantly, lessors have
ready access to oil and gas lawyers and support staff that can equal the playing field
considerably.
65. However, the mineral owner in many cases could be an oil company that has
acquired the minerals or a large institutional land owner such as a railroad or a

governmental entity.
66. Lessees that are packaging leases for sale to a third party will be reluctant to Include
any provision in the lease that is not typically found in existing lease forms. Since they rely
upon the secondary lease-trading market to sell their leases, they must be careful to ensure
that any lease they take is, in effect, "negotiable.' Pierce, supra note 3, at 457. The most
common transaction affecting title to leased minerals is the assignment of rights in an oil and
gas lease. Oil and gas leases are the negotiable instruments of the oil and gas business;
assignments are the documents used to transfer lease rights. David E. Pierce, An Analytical
Approach to DraftingAssignments, 44 Sw. LJ. 943 (1990).
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The lessor is a passive participant; she does not invest anything into the
venture other than the mineral interest she is leasing. The lessor typically
wants maximum development of the leased property since the lessor does
not bear any of the costs of development. Maximum development will
ordinarily result in maximization of the lessor's royalty income.'
2. Lessee
At one level, the lessee's business goals are the same as the lessor's:
to maximize production from the leased property.'M However, since the
lessee must carry all the risk, financial and otherwise, associated with
development, one more unit of production to the lessee will not necessarily
result in one more unit of wealth to the lessee.' Among the lessee's business
goals is the freedom to make development decisions about the leased
property7 For example, lessees typically maintain an inventory of leases
that exceed the number of wells for which they currently have funds to
drill. Therefore, the lessee will consider several factors to determine which
leases will be developed with available drilling funds. The primary term of
the lease, adjacent development, prospects for success, and lessor demands
will be among the variables the lessee will consider in allocating their
drilling budget. Once the lessee decides to spend her money on a drilling
project, she will want control over where and how the well is drilled, tested,
completed, and operated.
The lessee may also pursue economic opportunities beyond the
extraction of the oil and gas associated with the lease relationship. For
example, the lessee may want to try and package the production with other
production and move it to locations where it can be processed into other
products, sold, exchanged, or otherwise enhanced with new enterprenurial
capital in hopes of generating new profit. Many times one of the lessee's
business goals under the oil and gas lease is to acquire production which
she can use in her other enterprises, such as downstream marketing,
processing, refining, or retail distribution.'

67. If she owns the surface overlying the minerals, the lessor also contributes to the
venture the right to use the surface to the extent necessary to develop the minerals.
However, as with the granting of the lease, the lessor is typically compensated upfront for
the lease (bonus and delay rental) and for the surface easement (statutory or contracted.for
surface damage payment). See generally EUGENE 0. KuNTz ST AL., CAE AND MATERIALS ON
OIL AND GAS LAw 248 (2d ed. 1993).

68. Id.

69. Since the lessor has a risk-free share of production, one more unit of production
should result in one more unit of wealth to the lessor. Pierce, supra note 3, at 459.
70. KUNTZ ST AL, supra note 67, at 139.
71. Frequently lessors and lessees are involved in disputes concerning where the oil and
gas lease relationship ends and the lessee's separate business enterprises begin. David E.
Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The ContinuingSearchfor Analytical
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Common Disputes

The common types of oil and gas lease disputes can be placed into
the following six categories:n
1. Granting Clause Issues. These issues concern the rights
granted to the lessee and those retained by the lessor.
Frequent problems concern surface and subsurface use issues,
the mineral substances encompassed by the lease, the ability
to use leased substances for operations, and accommodation
doctrine issues.'3
2. Title Issues. Although these issues may encompass some of
the granting clause disputes, they generally relate to what the
lessor actually owns instead of what she has purported to
lease. Warranty, proportionate reduction, subrogation, and
subordination issues would come under this heading. Also,
subsequent transfers by the lessor can give rise to title issues
such as apportionment of royalty and the allocation of preexisting burdens on production.1A
3. Lease Terminating Events. This category includes any event
that can give rise to the automatic termination of the oil and
gas lease. Included in this category would be delay rental,
commencement, production, shut-in royalty, cessation of
production, dry hole, paying quantities, and force majeure
issues. It also includes any specialized lease clauses which
provide for automatic termination in the event the lessee fails
to perform as specified.'
4. Pooling and Unitization Issues. The granting, habendum,
and royalty clauses of the oil and gas lease are each typically
modified to some extent by lessee pooling or unitization. The
most frequent issues concern pooling under a lease pooling
clause or a separate pooling agreement. The scope of the
authority to pool, the lessee's good faith exercise of the
pooling power, and the impact of the pooling on the revenue
and operational aspects of the lease are all areas of potential
disagreement.'
5. Revenue Calculation Issues. This category concerns the

Foundations,47 Nsr. ON OmL &GAs L &TAX'N 1-1, 1-48 to 1-50 (1996); Pierce, supranote 1, at
819-28.
72. Professor Shade, in his prior study of this issue, arrived at very similar groupings
for disputes under the oil and gas lease. Shade, supranote 5, at 636.
73. Pierce, supra note 1, at 788-800.

74. Id. at 800-01.
75. Id. at 801-14.
76. Pierce, supra note 71, at 1-29.
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calculation of what the lessor should be receiving as
compensation under the oil and gas lease. Access to
production and marketing information is often an issue. The
basis for calculating the gross royalty due, the deduction of
costs, interest, and accounting, all create opportunities for
dispute." Division order disputes can be placed under this
category since they often give rise to issues that can
potentially impact revenue calculation. 8
6. Development Issues. Implied covenant obligations would
generally fall under this category. This would include issues
concerning the lessee's obligations to protect against
drainage, conduct further development, conduct further
exploration, and to efficiently operate the property."
Once these six categories are identified, they can be further
classified using the following three analytical tests:
1. Issues of Law or Fact. Does the precise issue involve an
issue of law or fact? If the facts are not in dispute, can the
issue be resolved by an application of legal principles? For
dispute resolution purposes, if one or more of the issues are
solely one of law, some sort of summary procedure, similar to
summary judgment in the litigation setting, should be
available to resolve purely legal issues.80 If there are issues of
fact that need to be resolved, the second analytical test should
be applied.
2. Technical or Non-Technical Issues of Fact. If the dispute
concerns non-technical issues of fact there may be no need for
expert testimony concerning whether, for example, the lessee
told the lessor that significant drainage of the leased property
was occurring. Such veracity issues may be best resolved by
having each party testify about what they said or were told
by the other party. However, if the issue is whether, in fact,
significant drainage is occurring, or whether a prudent
operator would take action to drill a well to protect against
drainage, these issues present technical issues of fact.
Typically these issues are resolved with the benefit of expert
testimony. These are also situations where veracity of the
expert is typically not the issue; instead the focus will be on
the method by which the expert arrived at their conclusion.
These situations may be better suited for a written report

77. Pierce, supra note 1, at 815-28.
78. David E. Pierce, Resolving Division OrderDisputes:A ConceptualApproach, 35 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1,16-38 to 16-41 (1989).
79. KuNTz ET AL, supra note 67, at 313.
80. For example, the authors have provided for a "Summary Procedure" in their sample
arbitration rules. See infra Appendix B, Rule 10.
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instead of oral testimony.
3. Low-Dollar or High-Dollar Issues. The financial impact of
the dispute will often be the determinative factor that defines
the appropriate dispute resolution technique. It is difficult to
justify $100,000 worth of "process" to resolve a $10,000
dispute. Therefore, an effort must be made to value disputes
so they can be dealt with in a procedurally efficient manner.
D. Traditional Dispute Resolution Techniques
Informal negotiation and litigation comprise the traditional dispute
resolution techniques employed by parties to the oil and gas lease.! As with
most business disputes, informal negotiation will take place when a
problem arises and the matter will often be resolved. However, the
dynamics of the process will often be impacted by the economic realities of
the dispute. For example, a lessor may discover that compression costs are
being deducted from their royalty payment. They contact their lessee and
object to the deduction. The lessee may reply that under their lease, or the
circumstances, the deduction is proper. The lessor then must decide
whether she wants to invest time and money into the dispute to obtain her
own legal evaluation of the lessee's position. If she does, she may discover
the lessee's interpretation was correct, incorrect, or the propriety of the
deduction is not clear under the facts or law, or both. If each party believes
they are correct in their position, and are unwilling to compromise, the
situation will stalemate with new animosity being injected into the
relationship each month royalties are paid - and compression costs
deducted.
Due to the amount involved, and the risk involved, neither party
may be willing to invest the time and money required to resolve the
dispute. These costs and risks are typically measured against what it will
cost to file suit and litigate the issue in court. The inherent costs associated
with litigation may mean the issue will continue to fester and manifest itself
at every opportunity within the relationship. The situation will either

81. See generallyShade, supranote 5, at 601, 620-21.
82. However, even if the compression cost issue is finally decided in court, or by some
other means such as arbitration, there will always be the problem of the "sore loser" who
will continue to disrupt the relationship even though a disinterested third party has
determined their concerns were unfounded. A major benefit of mediation is it tends to avoid
the "sore loser syndrome. As noted by Professor Shade:
Mediation does not address who is right and who is wrong. It avoids a clear
winner and loser. It 'speaks only of who will do what,' when it will be.
done, and how the problem will be resolved. The'absence of fault-finding
plus the experience of working cooperatively' toward a mutually agreeable
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result in continuing conflict or other collateral issues will be found within
the relationship that shift the litigation cost/benefit analysis to favor
litigation. For example, although the economics of the compression cost
issue may not, by itself, justify the cost of litigation, other issues may be
identified under the deteriorating relationship to change the litigation
equation.' For example, a disgruntled lessor may be willing to top lease
their property to a third party that will raise lease terminating issues and at
the same time provide the lessor with a litigation forum to resolve the
compression cost issue.8
E. Party Dispute Resolution Goals

1. Lessor
The lessor's primary dispute resolution goal will typically be the
creation of a cost-effective procedure through which they can air their
complaints and obtain an attentive audience with their lessee. If the parties
are unable to negotiate or mediate a solution to their differences, the lessor's
next goal would be to have a neutral, knowledgeable, third party review the
situation and resolve the dispute. Throughout the process the lessor's
primary concern will typically be the cost, in time and money, to pursue the
matter.' Therefore, the lessor will want a procedure that captures the
lessee's attention while preventing the process from becoming a spending
contest to see who can out-litigate the other.
Since most of the information concerning oil and gas disputes will
be under the lessee's control, the lessor will want access to information,
available to the lessee, that is relevant to the dispute. For example, the lessee
may be reluctant to provide their lessor with gas contracts that the lessor
believes adversely impact the calculation of royalty. However, to resolve the

solution can help preserve a relationship, which adjudication might
destroy.
Shade, supra note 5, at 622 (footnotes omitted).
83. The lessor may focus on shut-in royalty, cessation of production, pooling, paying
quantities, and similar issues that could result in termination of the lease. See generaly Pierce,
supra note 1, at 804 (discussing the impact of "the fee simple determinable model" on lessor
litigation).
84. The top lease situation can also provide the lessor with a cost-free advocate when
the top lessee agrees to prosecute the litigation while agreeing to hold the lessor harmless
for any costs associated with the litigation.
85. Perhaps the most efficient "dispute repression" mechanism is litigation. The costs
associated with litigation, coupled with the inability for any one party to effectively contain
costs once the process is triggered, serves as a major deterrent to litigation. However, this
often means the dispute never gets resolved; it just gets repressed awaiting other
opportunities to manifest itself in the relationship.
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dispute," it may be necessary to make this information available for no
other reason than to assuage a lessor's perhaps understandable, but
nevertheless unfounded, suspicions.
2. Lessee
To a large extent, lessee dispute resolution goals coincide with those
of the lessor. However, the existing oil and gas lease negotiation/litigation
approach to dispute resolution tends to favor lessees. Since the lessee is
typically the source of information," and the party that is more likely to
view litigation as a cost of doing business, the lessee enjoys a distinct
advantage in the negotiation/litigation context; she knows the economics
of the dispute, and the unfamiliar litigation environment, will tend to
dissuade the lessor from pursuing their litigation option. This is perhaps the
lessee's strongest negotiating tool: the lessor often has no real practical
option to accepting stalemate on the issue. In the meantime, the statute of
limitations is, by default, resolving the "old" elements of a continuing
dispute.
Most lessees, however, seek to avoid litigation with as much vigor
as their lessor counterparts to the relationship. Lessor discord can consume
a considerable amount of time and effort, even in the non-litigation context.
Unresolved disputes place the lessor/lessee relationship under stress and
invite otherwise uncharacteristic opportunistic behavior by the lessor in an
effort to obtain an attentive audience with their lessee, or a third party
decision-maker. Few lessees would deny that a healthy lessor/lessee
relationship is a desirable and valuable asset that should be pursued and
nurtured whenever practicable. There is such a thing as lessee "goodwill"
among lessors that is established through fair dealings between the parties
and the ability to address disputes in a manner that strengthens, instead of
weakens, the relationship.
Once lessees look beyond whatever subjective "edge" the current
negotiation/litigation mode provides them, their goals become very similar
to the lessor's goals: the creation of a cost-effective procedure by which each
party's concerns can be aired and resolved in an efficient manner. Most
lessees will also have other goals that are a product of the unique
opportunities provided by the ability to engage in their own private
ordering. These goals are often the product of past experiences-usually
bad experiences. The lessee will view any dispute resolution technique as
an opportunity to try and accomplish the following collateral, but

86. Even though the gas contract in fact does not impact the calculation of the lessor's
royalty.
87. This includes factual information, such as production sales agreements and
accounting data, and technical information, such as well logs and field studies.
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nevertheless very important, goals: (1)elimination of punitive damage risks
in the relationship; (2) elimination of risks associated with an impassioned
or unsophisticated jury; and (3) elimination of risks associated with an often
overworked, non-specialist, judge.'
IV.
A.

ARBITRATION OF LEASE DISPUTES

Structural Requirements: The Arbitration Clause

Once the parties have decided the arbitration alternative to
litigation is desired, the task will be to draft a contractual provision that will
effecti ely eliminate all permutations of the litigation option.8 To
accomplish this goal the oil and gas lease must contain a broad pre-dispute
arbitration clause. In an effort to create the broadest pre-dispute arbitration
clause possible, the authors have chosen the following language:
The parties to this oil and gas lease agree to resolve
by arbitration all disputes between them which arise out of,
or which in any way relate to:

88. Bishop, supra note 50, at 5-2.
89. One or both parties may prefer to leave certain issues for resolution by a court, or
provide for judicial review in defined situations. See generally, Bishop, supra note 50, at 5-30
to 5-31 ("[P]arties can increase the scope of judicial review by providing that 'errors of law
shall be subject to appeal.' In the absence of such a provision, errors of law by the arbitrators
will not usually constitute a basis for a vacatur of the award in the United States unless they
amount to a manifest disregard of law, which is a very stringent standard.). However, the
authors' sample clause assumes the parties have decided that all disputes arising between
them regarding the lease relationship will be determined in one final arbitration proceeding.
The goal is to limit, to the maximum extent possible, the litigation option and the
opportunity for judicial review of the arbitrator's award. Limited judicial review would still
be available under § 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act which provides, in part:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made....
9 U.S.C. § 9(a)(l)-(4) (1994).
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(1) The express or implied terms of the oil and gas lease;
(2) The resulting lease relationship; or
(3) Any pooling agreement, unitization agreement, division
order, or other title, development, or marketing document
associated with the lease terms or the lease relationship. 90
This language, coupled with language discussed in the sections that
follow, should avoid unnecessary diversions into court concerning whether
a matter is encompassed by the obligation to arbitrate.
1. Scope of ArbitrableIssues
The authors' sample arbitration clause is designed to encompass the
complete realm of disputes that may arise between an oil and gas lessor and
lessee. The clause addresses all disputes associated with the lease
relationship regardless of how they may be classified in a legal context.
Therefore, the clause includes not only "contractual" disputes but also those
that may be characterized as a tort or under some other common law or
statutory law label." The sample clause provides:
With the intent of maximizing the scope of arbitrable
matters in any way related to this oil and gas lease: any
dispute between the parties, whether classified as contract,
property, tort, or otherwise, associated with oil and gas
exploration, development, production, marketing, accounting, or post-production activities, shall be resolved by
arbitration; this includes any right or obligation created by
statute, regulation, resolution, ordinance, or other enactment
or order by a governmental entity; it also includes issues
relating to fraud, illegality, repudiation, or other theories that
attack the existence or validity of this oil and gas lease.'
Similarly, the clause addresses disputes that may technically arise
under a document besides the oil and gas lease, but which has an impact on
the parties' lease relationship. This would include documents such as a
declaration of pooling, a separate pooling agreement, unitization
agreement, division order, and production sales contracts. It would also
include rights under a pooling or unitization order."
To protect the arbitration process from any undesired detours into
court to address the scope of the arbitration clause, the sample clause

90. See infra Appendix A.
91. See, e.g., Beeson v. Erickson, 917 P.2d 901, 905 (Kan. App. 1996) (party attempting
to avoid arbitration unsuccessfully argued their cause of action sounded in tort and therefore
was not subject to arbitration).
92. See infra Appendix A.
93. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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provides: "If a party asserts a dispute is not subject to arbitration under the
arbitration provisions contained in this oil and gas lease, such arbitrability
issues will be resolved through arbitration." 4 Absent this provision, these
arbitrability issues would be addressed by the court."
2. Protectionfrom Arbitration-LimitingState Law Provisions
To ensure arbitration is not encumbered by limiting state law
provisions, the sample arbitration clause provides: "This is a contract
evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce and all matters
relating to arbitration pursuant to this oil and gas lease will be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 US.C. §§ 1-16."9 The Federal Arbitration Act
applies to: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce ....
Section 1 of the Act
defines "commerce"as "counerce among the several States or with foreign
nations.... ."" This language has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to cover any contract "affecting commerce" which signals
an intent "to exercise Congress's commerce power to the full."" Furthermore, the Act has been interpreted as a federal law that imposes substantive
limitations on state law when the parties express an intent to invoke the
benefits of the Federal Arbitration Act.1" For example, a state law
prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate issues sounding in tort1 °o

94. See infra Appendix A.
95. The United States Supreme Court, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
recognized that parties could agree that arbitrability issues would be determined by the
arbitrator instead of a court. However, if the contract providing for arbitration is not clear
on the matter, the arbitrability issue must be determined by the court. First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920,1923-24 (1995).
96. See infra Appendix A.

97. 9 U.s.C. § 2 (1994).
98. Id. at § 1.
99. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834,839,841 (1995).
100. E.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1654 (1996) (Federal
Arbitration Act preempted Montana statute that required, as a condition to enforcement of
an arbitration clause, '[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration... typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.').
101. The Kansas non-uniform version of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides, in part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a provision in a written contract to
submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties
is valid, enforceable and irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) shall not apply to: ... (3) any provision
of a contract providing for arbitration of a claim in tort.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (Supp. 1996).
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would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,' assuming the parties
otherwise agreed to arbitrate their tort-based disputes.1 3
The sample clause expressly selects the Federal Arbitration Act as
the governing law "relating to arbitration." This is designed to avoid
possible ambiguity created by a general choice of law provision that might
be included in the lease, other contracts, or the arbitration rules. The goal
is to make it clear that selecting, for example, New Mexico law to govern
substantive oil and gas law issues is not intended as a selection of New
Mexico law to govern issues regarding arbitration." '
3. Federal Court Authority to Enter Judgment Upon the Arbitrator'sAward
Due to the pro-arbitration attributes of federal law, the authors
have provided for federal enforcement of the arbitrator's award. In the
sample clause the authors provide: "Any award made pursuant to
proceedings authorized by this arbitration clause will be entered as a
judgment of the federal district court for the federal district where any
portion of the leased land affected by the arbitration is located."'o This
clause is designed to trigger the benefits of § 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act
which provides, in part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a
judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made
pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then
at any time within one year after the award is made any party
to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an

102. In Beeson v. Erickson the Kansas Court of Appeals noted:
Under both the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act,
a contractual provision to arbitrate applies regardless of whether the action
sounds in tort or in contract. R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band
Instrument Co., 7 Kan.App.2d 363, 365, 642 P.2d 127 (1982). Indeed, it
appears to us that under R.J. Palmer, this action may have been one where
'commerce' was involved. If that is true, then the Federal Act would have
preempted the Kansas Act and would have applied, and the tort exception
would not exist. Beeson v. Erickson, 917 P.2d 901, 904 (1996).
103. The parties' contract will define the scope of their obligation to arbitrate. If they
choose not to arbitrate tort disputes, their contract will govern. See generally Edward Brunet
& Walter E. Stern Drafting the Effective ADR ClauseforNaturalResources and Energy Contracts,
11 NAT. RSOuRcEs & ENVT 7, 7-8(1996) (discussing party preference for arbitration clauses
that cover either a broad or narrow scope of issues).
104. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218
(1995) (interpreting scope of choice-of-law provision and whether it limited arbitrator's
ability to award punitive damages). The best way to deal with the punitive damages issue
is to expressly address the availability of punitive damages either in the arbitration clause
or the arbitration rules. The authors have elected to address punitive damages and other
remedy-limiting provisions in their arbitration rules. See nfra Appendix B, Rule 9.
105. See infra Appendix A.
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order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must
grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title, °
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act permits the parties to
specify the court where enforcement can take place. The authors have
selected the federal district court where "any portion of the leased land" is
located since all disputes between the lessor and lessee will concern alease
which describes land in one or more areas. Either party could change this
to select a specific federal district court by name, such as "the federal
district court for the district of Kansas sitting in Wichita, Kansas." If the
parties fail to provide a formula to identify a specific court, § 9 provides: "If
no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application
may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which
such award was made.""°7
4. The ArbitrationDetails
Although the arbitration clause in the contract establishes the right
to have disputes arbitrated, the clause will generally incorporate a set of
rules that establish the details for how the arbitration will be conducted. For
example, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") recommends the
following clause for use in commercial contracts:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered
in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
The only detail the Federal Arbitration Act supplies, in the event
the parties fail to address the matter, is the appointment of the arbitrator."

106. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
107. Id.
108. COULSON, supra note 46, at 17.
109. Section 5 provides:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be
followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided
and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any
other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or
arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of
either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had
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The assumption is that the details will be established by the arbitrator once
they are identified."'
When dealing with a specific class of disputes, such as those
encountered between lessors and lessees in an oil and gas lease relationship,
the parties should establish the details that will govern the administration
of their disputes."' The rules can be designed to permit the parties to
administer the process or to authorize a third party to administer the
process. The sample arbitration rules provided by the authors anticipate
that a separate organization, the "Oil and Gas Dispute Resolution Institute,"
will exist to assist the parties in administering their arbitration.112 To date,
such an organization specifically designed to administer domestic oil and
gas disputes has not been formed.'

been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the
agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
110. See generally Morris, supra note 13, at 14-21 ('If the arbitration clause is terse and
makes no provision about what rules will govern, then it will become necessary for the
panel, after soliciting the views of counsel, to determine the manner in which the arbitration
will be conducted.').
111. Otherwise, a substantial portion of the time and expense associated with the
arbitration of a dispute will be determining the rules that will be followed in administering
the dispute. Also, many of the time- and money-saving "procedural" devices may not be as
safely pursued when they are being imposed by the arbitrator instead of having them
imposed by agreement of the parties. Bishop, supra note 50, at 5-29. For example, the parties
may agree to a summary procedure which limits the evidence that can be considered in
addressing a dispute. Such a party-imposed limitation would not provide a ground for
attacking the arbitrator's award for "refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy" because the arbitrator would not be "guilty of misconduct" as that ground is
defined in § 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1994).
112. Although this is a fictitious organization, many industries have tailored a dispute
resolution process, and supporting organizations, to meet their unique needs. Several
industry programs have been established through the American Arbitration Association. See
COULSON, supra note 46, at 57 (construction industry), 81 (textile and apparel industries), 99
(insurance claims). Other industries have established dispute resolution procedures and
rules through self-regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.'s arbitration process. The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution publishes the
CPR MAPP (Model ADR Procedures and Practices) Series which contain model dispute
resolution procedures with suggested guidelines concerning their use. The CPR MAPP on
Oil and Gas Industry ADR contains the CPR's 1991 report on dispute resolution options and
discusses how they might be employed to address certain types of disputes. CEUMER FOR
PIuBLIC RESOURCES, INC., ADR FOR OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY BuSWRSS DISPUTES (1991). (For
further information on the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution's publications, call (212) 9496490.).
113. One commentator has observed:
Various industry trade associations, such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers and the Grain and Feed Trade Association, have
developed specialized arbitration forums and rules for the principled
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Under the authors' proposed rules the administering organization
plays a more active role than is traditionally the case with other
organizations, such as the AAA. For example, if the dispute is resolved by
stipulation after the arbitration process is initiated, but before the individual
arbitrator is identified, the Executive Director of the administering
organization is deemed to be the arbitrator for the purpose of issuing an
award in accordance with the stipulation so it can be enforced as a
judgment under section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act." 4 Also, the
Institute serves as a sort of policing agency during the non-decisional
phases of the arbitration process. If a party is abusing the process, the
arbitrator selection process can be triggered by the Institute so the arbitrator

can take charge, impose sanctions if appropriate, and direct the parties to
properly exhaust their non-decisional remedies."' However, these same
types of administrative mechanisms could be established by the parties

through self-administered rules."'
B.

Structural Requirements: Arbitration Rules

The arbitration rules are typically where the dispute resolution
goals of the parties will be reflected. One of the major underlying goals of
lessors and lessees is to create a cost-effective procedure through which

resolution of disputes affecting their industry members. The oil and gas
industry has not followed this pattern. None of the trade associations
involved in the oil and gas industry have developed any arbitration forums
or arbitration rules. Moreover, many standard form contracts such as the
AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement do not contain arbitration
clauses....
In the international sphere, arbitration of energy disputes has become
commonplace. On the other hand, none of the domestic efforts to organize
forums or arbitrators for energy disputes have been dramatically successful
to date.
Bishop, supra note 50, at 5-2, 5-3.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. See infra Appendix B, Rules 4 & 5. Rule 5 provides, in part- 'If the parties are unable
to resolve their differences pursuant to section 4, the Institute will initiate the arbitrator
selection process .... "
116. However, the dispute resolution process may be more acceptable to lessors and
lessees if they know it will be administered by a disinterested but knowledgeable
organization. One group, working with Tulane University Law School and the U.S Maritime
Law Association, is developing a forum for the arbitration of offshore energy disputes that
will be administered by Tulane University. Bishop, supra note 50, at 5-3. One could easily
envision associations, such as the National Association of Royalty Owners and various state
oil and gas industry associations, joining forces to create the organization, arbitration clause,
and rules necessary to offer lessors and lessees viable dispute resolution alternatives to
litigation.
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they can efficiently resolve their disputes 1 7 The rules that follow attempt
to achieve this goal by: (1) defining the matters in dispute; (2) establishing
efficient mechanisms to identify the relevant facts regarding the matters in
dispute; (3) identifying issues of law and fact that must be decided; and (4)
creating an efficient decision-making process by which factual and legal
issues can be finally resolved either by the parties or, if they fail, by the
arbitrator.
Although detailed rules have been prepared by the authors, they
are intended as "default" rules in the event the parties are unable to agree
upon a better approach at the time a dispute materializes, or at the time the
dispute resolution process is unfolding. Therefore, Rule 1 provides, in part:
"At any time prior to issuance of the arbitrator's award in a proceeding, the
parties may agree, in writing, to supplement or amend these Rules or other
rules of procedure they have previously established."$ s
1. Defining the Dispute
The sample rules force the party desiring to initiate the arbitration
process to carefully consider all aspects of their dispute and carefully
evaluate the factual and legal basis of their claims. To commence the
arbitration proceeding the complaining party must prepare an "Arbitration
Notice" which includes the following:
a. A description of the dispute(s) giving rise to the
arbitration proceedings;
b. A statement indicating why the matter is subject to
arbitration under the lease arbitration clause;
c. A statement of the relevant facts necessary to resolve the
dispute;
d. A statement of the relevant law necessary to resolve the
dispute;
e. A statement of the relief sought by the party (if seeking a
sum of money, the specific amount alleged to be due and the
details of the calculation will be included); and
f. An appendix containing copies of all relevant documents,
cases, statutes, and other written material relevant to the
decision of the dispute 9
This is more than the pleading analog to a complaint. Instead, the
document will resemble a motion for summary judgment with a supporting

117. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
118. See infra Appendix B, Rule 1.
119. See infraAppendix B, Rule 2.
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brief.1 The responding party's Arbitration Notice Reply will respond to the
Notice with a similar level of detail.
To ensure the parties fully prepare their respective cases at this early
stage of the proceedings, the Rules provide: "The parties authorize the
arbitrator, when the arbitrator deems the matter ripe for summary disposition, to decide the dispute based solely upon the information contained in the
Arbitration Notice and the Arbitration Notice Reply."12' The goal in forcing
the parties to think through and put together their cases at the earliest stage
of the dispute is to provide them with information they will need to
effectively engage in the structured negotiation and mediation phases of the
arbitration process. 122 It also ensures that the mediator will have high quality
information in the event the parties are unable to negotiate a solutionm Frontloaded preparation also enables the arbitrator to dispose of the dispute at the

120. The Rules place a 25-page limit on the Arbitration Notice and the Arbitration Notice
Reply. See infra Appendix B, Rules 2 & 3.
121. See infra Appendix B, Rule 10. The Rule is designed to permit the arbitrator to
resolve the dispute, based upon the initial submissions of the parties, without running afoul
of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Rule provides further:
The parties agree that for purposes of 9 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
they will be deemed to have had a complete opportunity to present
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy by the process of filing
either an Arbitration Notice or an Arbitration Notice Reply as provided for
in §§ 2 and 3 of these Rules. The decision to employ this summary
procedure will be in the sole discretion of the arbitrator which the
arbitrator will exercise after reviewing the content of the Arbitration Notice
and Arbitration Notice Reply(ies).
122. See infra Appendix B, Rule 4.
123. A common criticism of mediation concerns the mediator's inability to become
thoroughly familiar with the dispute so they can properly mediate. Often this is due to
unreasonable limitations placed on the mediator's preparation. One commentator has
observed:
The ability of a mediator to bring the parties together very often depends
on his ability to convince both parties that each indeed has something to
lose in the event a voluntary settlement cannot be achieved. To achieve this
end, the mediator should be as fully informed as possible of both the facts
and the legal issues before commencement of the process itself. This will
avoid perhaps the most frequently voiced complaint regarding mediation:
that the mediator makes observations and recommendations premised
upon an incomplete knowledge of the facts and/or "from the hip" law.
Unfortunately, in many instances the unwillingness of the parties to
undertake the expense necessary to allow the mediator the preparation
time to do an effective job dooms the effort to failure before it begins. If this
one pitfall can be avoided, the probability of success of a mediation will
increase dramatically.
Robert K. Pezold, The Effective Use ofADR, 42 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INSr. 20-1, 20-4 (1997).
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earliest stage possible, 2
The arbitrator is the key to ensuring the summary procedure
provision works smoothly. An arbitrator knowledgeable with the subject
matter, and trained in the law,' should be able to readily determine when
they have the information required to fairly resolve the dispute. In many
instances, where the determinative issues are issues of law, the arbitrator
should be able to render a decision relying upon the Notice, the Reply, and
their own independent legal research. Perhaps more importantly, it lodges
the discovery process with the arbitrator instead of the parties. 2 After the
initial Notice and Reply, even the pleading process comes under the control
of the arbitrator," For example, a party may raise the equivalent of a
counterclaim in her Reply. If the arbitrator believes it would be helpful to
have a reply to the counterclaim, she can fashion the specific issues she
wants the replying party to address.
2. Managingthe DisputeResolution Process
The sample rules rely heavily upon the selected arbitrator to
accomplish the parties' dispute resolution goals. In this regard, Rule 7
provides, in part:
The parties direct the arbitrator to resolve the
disputes between them in the most efficient manner possible
considering the monetary value of the dispute, the relative
complexity of the factual issues associated with the dispute,
and the long-term impact the dispute could have on the
parties' lease relationship. However, any selected course of
action in pursuit of these goals will be at the arbitrator's sole
discretion."

124. The summary procedure is under the complete control of the arbitrator. The Rule
also provides:
In the event the arbitrator determines the matter is not ripe for summary
disposition based upon the Notice and Reply, the arbitrator may receive
additional information from the parties and, at any subsequent time, find
that the matter is ripe for summary disposition.
See infra Appendix B, Rule 10.
125. The authors have specified that the arbitrator be selected from an Institute-

generated list which will "include only persons who are lawyers knowledgeable in oil and
gas law." See infra Appendix B, Rule 5.
126. See infra Appendix B, Rule 7, which provides, in part: "If the arbitrator determines
that further information is necessary or desirable, the arbitrator will fashion the procedure
which they believe will most efficiently produce the information in a manner consistent with
the parties' dispute resolution goals."
127. Id.
128. See infra Appendix B, Rule 7.
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The arbitrator will be guided by this "efficiency standard" when
determining the pleading, discovery, and hearing procedures that will be
employed. With regard to these procedural matters, Rule 7 provides:
If the arbitrator determines that further information
is necessary or desirable, the arbitrator will fashion the
procedure which they believe will most efficiently produce
the information in a manner consistent with the parties'
dispute resolution goals. The procedure selected by the
arbitrator may, or may not, include oral presentations or live
testimony. In the event the arbitrator desires to have live inperson proceedings, they will be conducted at a date, time,
and location designated by the arbitrator. Either before or
after fashioning a proposed procedure to govern subsequent
proceedings, the arbitrator may, if it is deemed efficient under
the circumstances, obtain the input of the parties regarding
the proposed procedure.'"
If the procedures created by the arbitrator are unacceptable to the
parties, under Rule 1 they can always "agree, in writing, to supplement or
amend"1 the rules by designating the procedure they want the arbitrator to
follow. '
3. Revealing the Arbitrator'sThought Process
Rule 8 employs a procedural innovation that provides the parties
with an opportunity to comment upon the arbitrator's proposed award and
draft opinion. Once the arbitrator has reached a decision, she is required to
prepare a Draft Opinion which contains the arbitrator's "findings of fact,
conclusions of law, analysis of the dispute, and proposed award." 3 ' The
parties have the right to prepare briefs commenting on the Draft Opinion
and "[u]pon receipt of the parties' briefs, the arbitrator may reopen the
proceedings to obtain further information or proceed with issuance of an
award and Final Opinion."'32 This procedure is designed to address a
complaint associated with "neutral" arbitration: the arbitrator may simply
misunderstand a party's position." The value of this procedure is increased

129. Id.
130. See infra Appendix B, Rule 1.
131. See infra, Appendix B, Rule 8.
132. Id.
133. In noting the benefits of "interest arbitration," where there are two non-neutral
party-selected arbitrators and one neutral arbitrator, Robert Pezold has stated:
[P]articipation of the interest arbitrators in the decision-making process
ensures that each party's case, will be fully presented to the neutral
decision-maker. For example, one of the functions of an interest arbitrator
is to be certain that any confusion which the neutral arbitrator may have
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by the requirement that the arbitrator reveal through findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and analysis the basis for the draft and final opinions.
This provides the parties with the opportunity to identify specific factual
and legal findings, and legal analysis, they believe is flawed. The arbitrator
can then decide whether the proceedings need to be reopened to focus on
a factual issue or whether a legal issue needs to be researched, briefed, or
argued further.
Although some commentators believe issuing a detailed opinion is
an unnecessary invitation for challenge to the arbitrator's award,"3' others
feel it is a necessary part of the dispute resolution process." The authors
believe that a detailed opinion should be issued, in the oil and gas lease

concerning a party's presentation is clarified during the presentation of
evidence, or at any rate, during the deliberative process. This feature alone
virtually eliminates the fears held by most lawyers presenting complicated
cases to a single decision-maker-i.e., that the decision-maker might not
understand or appreciate an essential part of their case, and that the
attorney will not know of the decision maker's confusion until after a
decision is rendered.
Pezold, supra note 123 at 20-10.
134. Coulson offers the following commentary:
Arbitrators are not required to write opinions explaining the reasons for
their decisions. As a general rule, AAA commercial awards consist of a
brief decision on a single sheet of paper. Written opinions can be dangerous
because they identify targets for the losing party to attack ....
The AAA does not encourage such opinions. In some cases, both parties
want an opinion. Then the AAA has no objection. Usually, however, the
parties look to an arbitrator for a decision, not an explanation.
COULSON, supra note 46, at 30.
Robert Pezold also recommends that no explanation be given for the award:
'rrlhere is no obligation on the part of the arbitrators to explain or provide
reasons underlying their award. In fact, doing so is, and should be,
discouraged. Brevity and conciseness in an award will lessen both the
likelihood of an objection to the award, and the possibility that such an
objection would be sustained. Accordingly, unless the parties insist, the
arbitration agreement itself should contain no specific requirement that
arbitrators do anything other than render an award.
Pezold, supra note 123 at 20-34.
135. The Center for Public Resources offers the following view:
Most parties engaging in arbitration want to know the basis on which the
arbitrator(s) reached their decision. Our Committee, moreover, considers
it good discipline for arbitrators to require them to spell out their
reasoning. Sometimes this process gives rise to second thoughts as to the
soundness of the result ....

In the Committee's view the risk that a

reasoned award will be successfully challenged normally is small and is
outweighed by the other considerations mentioned above.
CENTER FOR PUBLIc RESOURCES, INc., RULES AND CoMMENTARY FOR NON-ADMINISrEnED
ARBITRATION OF BUsi's DISPur Rule 13, cmt.
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situation, for three reasons: first, it forces the arbitrator to carefully work
through the relevant facts and law to arrive at a reasoned decision; second,
it permits the parties to focus on specific misconceptions the arbitrator may
have concerning the facts or law as part of the Draft Opinion review
process;' 36 third, it brings a degree of closure to the dispute and will
hopefully dissuade future disputes over the same or similar issues."'
Written opinions should also serve a useful function regarding the
preclusive effect of the arbitration proceeding.s To the extent they are
available for consideration in subsequent disputes between the same
parties,' 3 it may eliminate the tendency to prospectively revisit issues that
have been previously determined by an arbitrator."" For example, suppose
for the 1991 to 1996 time period the arbitrator determines that a lessee
improperly deducted compression costs and awards the lessor $100,000 in
damages. The arbitrator arrives at its decision based upon an interpretation
of the express terms of the royalty clause. When the lessee continues to
deduct compression costs in 1997 and beyond, and the lessor initiates
arbitration to recover the deducted costs, must the second arbitrator again
interpret the royalty clause? Can the arbitrator simply rely upon the
interpretation made by the previous arbitrator and award a sum of money?
The authors' sample rules provide for a more efficient way to deal
with the prospective effect of an arbitrator's findings. Under Rule 9 any
party can request the arbitrator to grant declaratory relief that will define
the parties' rights and obligations prospectively as part of the arbitrator's
award." However, even without the benefit of declaratory relief, Rule 8
provides: "The arbitrator's Final Opinion will constitute binding precedent
between the parties regarding matters addressed by the arbitrator and, to
136. See supratext accompanying notes 130-32.
137. This third reason is the one most relevant to the oil and gas lease since the
relationship, in most situations, will continue long after the arbitration is completed. See
Brunet &Stern, supranote 103, at 69 ("[S]ome parties may want written reasons or findings
of fact explaining the arbitration award. These can help the parties to accept the award as
rational and reasoned.").
138. See generally 2 DAuEi, supra note 35, at § 24.02 (res judicata) &§ 24.03 (collateral
estoppel).
139. The confidentiality provisions of the arbitration clause and rules should contain a
specific exception for the admission of the arbitrator's opinion in subsequent arbitration
proceedings between the parties to the lease, or their successors or assigns. For example,
Rule 13 provides, in part: 'However, the Final Opinion in any arbitration proceeding can be
used by a party in any subsequent arbitration proceeding concerning the same oil and gas
lease." See infra Appendix B,Rule 13.
140. See generally, 1 DAUza supranote 7,at 7-39 to 7-42.
141. Rule 9 provides, in part: 'The arbitrator is authorized to fashion any remedy they
deem appropriate under the circumstances, including specific performance and declaratory
relief that will govern the prospective rights and obligations of the parties under the oil and
gas lease." See infra Appendix B,Rule 9.
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the extent it is relevant, will be adhered to in subsequent proceedings
governing the parties' rights and obligations under the oil and gas lease.""
Therefore, to the extent the prior arbitrator decided an interpretive issue
relevant to a current dispute, the matter cannot be reargued in a subsequent
arbitration proceeding. The only issue would be how much the lessee
improperly deducted.
The authors have responded to the major argument against
providing a written opinion by addressing the judicial review issue headon. Rule 8 concludes by providing:
Although the parties, by this Rule, are requiring the
arbitrator to issue a detailed Final Opinion, they do not intend
to expand in any way judicial review of the arbitrator's
findings, conclusions, analysis, or award. Instead, the parties
intend that the arbitrator's award will be reviewable only on
the limited grounds specified in the Federal Arbitration Act.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.43
The confidentiality provisions of Rule 13 also promote limited
review by prohibiting disclosure of the Final Opinion; only the Arbitrator's
Award will be made public in the process of entering it as a judgment.'"
4. Selecting the Arbitrator
The Achilles heel of the authors' sample rules is the arbitrator. Rule
5 addresses the arbitrator selection process and contemplates that the
Institute will play the major role in identifying competent candidates."0 The
Oil & Gas Dispute Resolution Institute is a recommended solution to a
problem several distinguished practitioners have noted regarding oil and
gas arbitration: the need for an administering organization familiar with the
oil and gas industry that can identify potential arbitrators with the required
oil and gas expertise.'4 The Washburn University School of Law is currently

142. See infra Appendix B, Rule 8. Rule 8 also makes the Final Opinion and Arbitrator's
Award binding on the successors and assigns of the parties to the oil and gas lease.
143. See infra Appendix B, Rule 8.
144. See infra Appendix B, Rule 13.
145. See infra Appendix B, Rule 5.
146. James Brown and John Melick have noted that one of the areas of greatest need is
'ensuring that disputes are resolved by persons sufficiently expert in the coal, oil, and gas
fields." Brown & Melick, supra note 52, at 1-30. In commenting on the process for identifying
the industry expert, it is noted that short of naming the arbitrator in advance in the
agreement:
The second way that access to truly expert arbitrators can be provided for
in an agreement is to designate a particular institution as that which will be
relied upon to furnish the requisite expertise. Although AAA now does a
commendable job in serving that function, its voluntary and generic

Spring 1997] STRUCTURAL MODEL FOR ARBITRATING DISPUTES

443

exploring a possible role it might play in this area through the joint efforts
of its established Alternative Dispute Resolution academic and clinical programs4 7 and its oil and gas law faculty." This article represents our initial
effort to explore dispute resolution alternatives under the oil and gas lease
relationship.
Rule 5 instructs the Institute to initiate the arbitrator selection
process "by providing the parties with identical lists containing the names
of five potential arbitrators."' 49 The list can include only "persons who are
lawyers knowledgeable in oil and gas law. " ss Although the mediator does
not need to be trained in the law, the extensive procedural discretion given
to the arbitrator dictates that she be a lawyer. Only a lawyer can efficiently
and fairly make the numerous decisions required of her as the arbitrator
under the proposed rules.5 1 The arbitrator will determine whether there are
disputed issues of fact or law, she will tailor the discovery and other
procedural mechanisms to flesh out the dispute, she will render a final
opinion based upon her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and legal
analysis.' 5
To assist the parties in conducting their due diligence of the five
persons named on the list of potential arbitrators, Rule 5 contemplates that

characteristics may not serve the interests of all potential disputants
adequately.
Id. Robert Pezold has noted:
Another relative disadvantage of neutral arbitration is that it is difficult to
find a single arbitrator upon whom both parties can agree. Indeed, the
search itself can consume a great deal of time. If the parties rely upon an
agency to select a neutral, such as the AAA or CPR, the parties may well
sacrifice all hope of obtaining specialized expertise, or in the worst
instance, even basic qualifications. If instead the parties rely on a court,
then even the basic levels of disclosure required of a neutral may be lost.
Finally, a neutral selected by an agency not associated with the parties has
no incentive to be responsive to the needs or desires of the parties in
respect of timing, venue, and hearing procedure.
Pezold, supra note 123, 20-13 to 20-14.
147. Directed by Professor Loretta W. Moore.
148. Directed by Professor David E. Pierce.
149. See infra Appendix B, Rule 5.
150. Id.
151. Rule 8 provides, in part:
In deciding any dispute the arbitrator will endeavor to apply the
appropriate law to the dispute, including, without limitation, any
applicable statute of limitation. However, the arbitrator will not be
required to follow formal rules of evidence and can, if they deem it
appropriate, consider applicable industry norms or other matters tending
to define the business context of the dispute.
See infra Appendix B, Rule 8.
152. See infra Appendix B,Rules 7-10.
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the Institute will provide the parties with a completed "Arbitrator's
Questionnaire."" One of the Institute's roles would be to review the
Arbitration Notice and then identify potential arbitrators with the expertise
to administer the dispute. At this stage the Institute would attempt to screen
out candidates that had obvious conflicts, or who were not interested in
being considered, in an effort to create an initial list of five eligible
candidates. The screening would include identifying any situation that
would disqualify the arbitrator under, for example, the AAA-ABA Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes."M Although the parties will
be limited by the Institute's listss the selected arbitrator, in any event,
"must be impartial.""
The authors have elected to rely solely on neutral arbitration using
a single arbitrator.'5 Since one of the major goals is to contain the cost of the
process, and one of the major costs will be the arbitrator's fee, a single
arbitrator is being used. The authors also thought that the benefits of
interest arbitration could be obtained, without the use of non-neutral
arbitrators, by careful selection of potential arbitrators familiar with the
issues in dispute and the provision for party review of the arbitrator's
preliminary opinion and award.l's
5. Cost Concerns
Although the authors have attempted to streamline the dispute
resolution process as much as possible, one of our major fears is that it will
still prove to be too expensive in some situations. For example, suppose a
lessor believes that the lessee's use of an injection well for disposal of offlease produced water is beyond the scope of the lease granting clause. Can
the lessor afford to go through the proposed dispute resolution process to
resolve a dispute which may have minimal economic consequences for
either party? On the other hand, the parties face the same problem with the
litigation option. The major difference with the proposed dispute resolution
process is there are several opportunities to resolve the dispute; in the
litigation process there is usually one opportunity. For example, if the
lessee's area manager knows the lessor can trigger a process that requires
the area manager's supervisor to get involved, or that will involve company

153. See infra Appendix B, Rule 5.
154. Coulson, supra note 46, at 171-79.
155. Unless, of course, the parties are able to agree upon an alternative procedure they
prefer. See infra Appendix B, Rule 1.
156. See infra Appendix B,Rule 5. One of the grounds for vacating an arbitrator'saward
under the Federal Arbitration Act is "evident partiality' of the arbitrator.9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)
(1994).
157. See infra Appendix B, Rule 6.
158. See supra note 133.
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personnel from outside the area's business unit, they may be more
accommodating in trying to resolve the lessor's complaints informally. Also,
the process is phased so that the lessor can pursue the formal negotiation
process for $500 and then make a decision whether they want to invest
more into the process if it goes to mediation, or arbitration.'"S
From the lessee's view, there is a legitimate concern that by making
the process too accessible they will be inviting frivolous abuse of the process
to obtain periodic command audiences with the lessee's decision-makers.
This is one reason the authors have provided for a non-refundable filing fee
to initiate the process. Although we have selected $500, this amount is not
calculated to compensate the Institute for its services, but rather to
discourage abuse of the process.
The rules provide for the mediator and arbitrator to estimate the
cost of their services; these estimates will be used to calculate a 110 percent
deposit on fees that will be collected by the Institute prior to each phase of
the process."W The party initiating the process must provide the deposit for
the mediator's estimate. The deposit for the arbitrator's estimate will be
divided between the parties to the dispute. However, if the replying party
fails to post her part of the deposit, the complaining party must do so, but
she will be entitled to an amount equal to ten times the amount posted on
the replying party's behalf -regardless of the outcome of the proceedings.'
Failure to timely post a deposit will result in dismissal of the proceedings
which can be refiled only upon payment of a new filing fee." Therefore,
since failure to pay a deposit is jurisdictional, the complaining party must
be prepared to cover for the replying party's failure to post her share of the
arbitration cost estimate. The rules also provide the mediator and arbitrator
with certain contractual rights and protections regarding their fees and
potential liability. 163

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See infra Appendix B, Rule 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rule 13 provides, in part:
The parties further agree to indemnify and hold harmless any mediator,
arbitrator, the Institute, and members of the Institute, against any claim,
loss, or damage, including attorney fees and litigation expenses, a
including claims based unon the sole or concurrent nez4rence of any

mediator, arbitrator the Institute. or members of the institute, arising out

of or related to the dispute resolution proceedings contemplated by these
Rules. For purposes of these Rules, the parties intend that any mediator,
arbitrator, the Institute, and members of the Institute, are to be intended
third party beneficiaries of the parties' obligations under these Rules to
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6. Confidentiality
To achieve the goal of privacy in the dispute resolution process,
Rule 13 provides, in part:
All information provided during the course of the
arbitration proceedings, including the negotiation and
mediation phases, and including the arbitrator's Draft
Opinion and Final Opinion, will be kept confidential by all
parties involved in the process. However, the Final Opinion
in any arbitration proceeding can be used by a party in any
subsequent arbitration proceeding concerning the same oil
and gas lease. If a party is ordered by a court to reveal
information covered by this section, they will inform the court
of this confidentiality obligation and seek to have any
required disclosure made in the most protective manner they
can arrange under the circumstances.
The parties agree that they will not call any mediator,
arbitrator, or member of the Institute to be a witness, or
otherwise provide information or testimony in any form,
regarding any matter in any way related to the dispute
resolution proceedings contemplated by these Rules.'"
Although the Final Opinion will be available in future arbitration
proceedings concerning the lease, no other disclosure is authorized. Under
no circumstances do the rules permit the parties to call a mediator,
arbitrator, or Institute member as a witness or to provide "information or
testimony" concerning dispute resolution proceedings.ee
V. CONCLUSION
The authors have sought to achieve two goals with this article: First,
to provide a tangible vehicle for evaluating the use of arbitration to address
oil and gas lease disputes. Second, to demonstrate the potential value of an
organization that specializes in administering dispute resolution processes
for the oil and gas industry. Although we could have addressed these issues
in the abstract, we chose to address them through prototype contract
language and arbitration rules that make it easier to evaluate the dispute
resolution models. It is hoped this approach will assist lessors and lessees

include, without limitation, the obligation to pay fees under § 11 and the
obligation to indemnify and hold harmless under this § 13.
See infra Appendix B,Rule 13.
164. Id. See generally Moore, supra,note 35,at 700-09 (addressing confidentiality concerns
in mediation).
165. Id.
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in designing better processes for resolving the inevitable disputes they will
encounter under their oil and gas lease relationships.
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Appendix A
A sample arbitration clause for the oil and gas lease could provide as
follows:
Arbitration of Disputes. The parties to this oil and gas lease agree to
resolve by arbitration all disputes between them which arise out of, or
which in any way relate to:
(1) The express or implied terms of the oil and gas lease;
(2) The resulting lease relationship; or
(3) Any pooling agreement, unitization agreement, division
order, or other title, development, or marketing document
associated with the lease terms or the lease relationship.
With the intent of maximizing the scope of arbitrable matters in any
way related to this oil and gas lease: any dispute between the parties,
whether classified as contract, property, tort, or otherwise, associated with
oil and gas exploration, development, production, marketing, accounting,
or post-production activities, shall be resolved by arbitration; this includes
any right or obligation created by statute, regulation, resolution, ordinance,
or other enactment or order by a governmental entity; it also includes issues
relating to fraud, illegality, repudiation, or other theories that attack the
existence or validity of this oil and gas lease.
If a party asserts a dispute is not subject to arbitration under the
arbitration provisions contained in this oil and gas lease, such arbitrability
issues will be resolved through arbitration.
Arbitration of any matter under this oil and gas lease will be
conducted pursuant to the "Oil &Gas Lease Dispute Arbitration Rules-1997
Edition" established by the Oil & Gas Dispute Resolution Institute, which
rules are, by this reference, incorporated into and made a part of this oil and
gas lease. This is a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce and all matters relating to arbitration pursuant to this oil and gas
lease will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 US.C. §§ 1-16. Any
award made pursuant to proceedings authorized by this arbitration clause
will be entered as a judgment of the federal district court for the federal
district where any portion of the leased land affected by the arbitration is
located.
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Appendix B
OIL & GAS LEASE DISPUTE
ARBITRATION RULES
1997 Edition
1. Selection of Rules. When the parties to an oil and gas lease ("lease")
agree to arbitrate a dispute pursuant to the Oil & Gas Lease Dispute
Arbitration Rules-1997 Edition ("Rules"), they will be deemed to have
adopted by reference these Rules as established and administered by the Oil
& Gas Dispute Resolution Institute ("Institute"). However, the parties to the
lease may supplement or amend these Rules through language in the lease
that expressly references how the Rules are being altered. At any time prior
to issuance of the arbitrator's award in a proceeding, the parties may agree,
in writing, to supplement or amend these Rules or other rules of procedure
they have previously established.
2. Commencement of Arbitration Proceedings. A party commences
arbitration proceedings by serving an Arbitration Notice on all other parties
to the lease, serving an Arbitration Notice on the Institute (3 copies), and
paying to the Institute the filing fee required by § 11 of these Rules. The
Arbitration Notice will contain the following information:
a. A description of the dispute(s) giving rise to the arbitration
proceedings;
b. A statement indicating why the matter is subject to arbitration
under the lease arbitration clause;
c. A statement of the relevant facts necessary to resolve the dispute;
d. A statement of the relevant law necessary to resolve the dispute;
e. A statement of the relief sought by the party (if seeking a sum of
money, the specific amount alleged to be due and the details of the
calculation must be included); and
f. An appendix containing copies of all relevant documents, cases,
statutes, and other written material relevant to the decision of the dispute.
The Arbitration Notice cannot exceed twenty-five pages in length
excluding the appendix provided for in subsection f.
3. Reply to Arbitration Notice. On or before the thirtieth day following the
date the Arbitration Notice is received, each recipient will prepare and
serve on the other parties to the lease, and on the Institute (3 copies), an
Arbitration Notice Reply ("Reply") which contains the following
information:
a. A statement indicating whether the replying party believes the
matter is subject to arbitration under the terms of the lease;
b. A statement identifying the listed facts in the Arbitration Notice
which are disputed and those that are not disputed;
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c. A statement identifying any additional relevant facts which were
not referenced in the Arbitration Notice;
d. A statement of the relevant law necessary to resolve the dispute;
e. A statement of the relief being sought by the replying party (if
seeking a sum of money, the specific amount alleged to be due and the
details of the calculation must be included); and
f. An appendix containing copies of all relevant documents, cases,
statutes, and other written material relevant to the decision of the dispute
that are not otherwise contained in the Arbitration Notice.
The Reply cannot exceed twenty-five pages in length excluding the
appendix provided for in subsection f.
4. Party Discussions and Mediation. Upon receipt of the Reply, each party
will identify someone in their organization that has the decision-making
authority to grant the remedy sought by the other party(ies). Where a party
is an organization, the decision-maker's authority to act should be stated in
a properly executed power of attorney designating the decision-maker as
the organization's attorney-in-fact with actual authority to agree to the
remedy sought by the other party. Whenever possible: (1) the decisionmaker who is identified should have no prior contact with the dispute
triggering the arbitration; and (2) they should be from outside the particular
department or business unit that has responsibility for the particular lease
involved.
Each party will notify the Institute of their selected decision-maker
on or before the tenth day following receipt of all party Replies; if the party
is an organization, they will include with their notice a copy of the required
power of attorney. The Institute will then coordinate a meeting in which the
selected decision-makers will confer face-to-face with one another in an
effort to resolve their differences. The meeting shall take place on or before
the thirtieth day following each party's selection of a decision-maker. The
meeting will be at a date, time, and location agreed to by the parties; if the
parties are unable to agree, the date, time, and location of the meeting will
be designated by the Institute.
If the parties are able to resolve some or all of their differences, they
will enter into a Joint Stipulation that identifies the dispute they have
resolved, and whether any dispute remains that requires further arbitration.
The Joint Stipulation will be filed with the Institute.
If matters remain unresolved following the meeting, the Institute
will give the parties a ten-day period in which to agree upon the selection
of a mediator to work with the parties in an effort to resolve their remaining
differences. If the parties are unable to agree upon a mediator within the
ten-day period, the Institute will appoint the mediator. Any mediator
appointed by the Institute will be a lawyer knowledgeable in oil and gas
law. Upon identification of the mediator, the Institute will forward to the
mediator a copy of the Arbitration Notice, the Arbitration Notice Reply(ies),
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and any Joint Stipulations. The mediation will be commenced on or before
the forty-fifth day following the meeting of decision-makers. If the parties
are able to resolve some or all of their differences, they will enter into a Joint
Stipulation that identifies the dispute(s) they have resolved, and whether
any dispute remains that requires further arbitration. The Joint Stipulation
will be filed with the Institute.
Any Joint Stipulation that resolves all disputes between the parties
will name the current Executive Director of the Institute as the parties'
selected arbitrator for the sole purpose of issuing an award that
incorporates the terms of the Joint Stipulation. Upon issuing the award
incorporating the Joint Stipulation, the arbitration will terminate.
If the mediator determines that a party is not participating in the
mediation process in good faith, the mediator can terminate the mediation
by delivering to the Institute the following document titled "Termination
Statement":
TERMINATION STATEMENT
This mediation is being terminated because the mediator does not
believe that [name of party(s)] is (are) participating in the mediation process
in good faith.
[Signed by Mediator]
Upon receipt of the mediator's Termination Statement, the Institute
will proceed with selection of an arbitrator pursuant to section 5. The
Institute will provide the arbitrator with a copy of the mediator's
Termination Statement which, for purposes of section 9, will be conclusive
on the issue of the party's lack of good faith during the mediation process.
Under no circumstances will the mediator be called by the parties, or the
arbitrator, to be a witness, or otherwise provide information or testimony
in any form, regarding the mediation. The only evidence the parties can
present, or the arbitrator request, concerning the terminated mediation
process, is evidence that will assist the arbitrator in calculating the amount
necessary to fully compensate the complying party as required by section
9.
5.
Arbitrator Selection. If the parties are unable to resolve their
differences pursuant to section 4, the Institute will initiate the arbitrator
selection process by providing the parties with identical lists containing the
names of five potential arbitrators. The Institute's list of arbitrators will
include only persons who are lawyers knowledgeable in oil and gas law.
Each list will be accompanied by an Arbitrator's Questionnaire completed
by each potential arbitrator. Each party is given the option to strike up to
two names from the list. Each party will then rank numerically (with
number 1 being their first choice) each of the unstruck names on their list.
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The parties must report their strikes and rankings to the Institute within ten
days following receipt of the list.
If there are only two parties involved, the Institute will appoint the
arbitrator from the list that coincides, as closely as possible, with the
highest-ranked unstruck person on each party's list. When there are more
than two parties, if the process does not yield an unstruck candidate after
circulating two lists, the parties will have a period of three days to agree
upon an arbitrator among one of the ten listed and, failing agreement, the
Institute will randomly select a name from the ten candidates.
If at any stage of the selection process a party fails to timely or
properly respond, all candidates on the list(s) will be deemed acceptable to
the party.
The Executive Director of the Institute, during any phase of the
dispute resolution procedures provided for by these Rules, may trigger
selection of an arbitrator whenever it becomes apparent to the Executive
Director an arbitrator is needed to manage the process.
The selected arbitrator must be impartial and will be governed by
the AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.
One Arbitrator Unless Otherwise Agreed. Unless the parties agree
6.
otherwise at the time the arbitrator selection process begins, all disputes will
be determined by a single arbitrator. In the event the parties agree to have
more than one arbitrator, they must agree on an odd number of arbitrators
and the Institute will, once the desired number of arbitrators is identified,
design the lists and process that will be used to select the arbitrators. If the
parties fail to agree upon the number of arbitrators, the Institute will
proceed to have the dispute determined by a single arbitrator.
7.
Arbitrator's Case Management Role. Upon identification of the
arbitrator, the Institute will forward to the arbitrator a copy of the
Arbitration Notice, the Arbitration Notice Reply(ies), and any Joint
Stipulations. After reviewing the Arbitration Notice, Arbitration Notice
Reply, and any Joint Stipulations, the arbitrator will decide whether the case
is ripe for decision pursuant to § 10 of these Rules, or whether further
information is necessary or desirable.
The parties direct the arbitrator to resolve the disputes between
them in the most efficient manner possible considering the monetary value
of the dispute, the relative complexity of the factual issues associated with
the dispute, and the long-term impact the dispute could have on the parties'
lease relationship. However, any selected course of action in pursuit of
these goals will be at the arbitrator's sole discretion. If the arbitrator
determines that further information is necessary or desirable, the arbitrator
will fashion the procedure which they believe will most efficiently produce
the information in a manner consistent with the parties' dispute resolution
goals. The procedure selected by the arbitrator may, or may not, include
oral presentations or live testimony. In the event the arbitrator desires to
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have live in-person proceedings, they will be conducted at a date, time, and
location designated by the arbitrator. Either before or after fashioning a
proposed procedure to govern subsequent proceedings, the arbitrator may,
if it is deemed efficient under the circumstances, obtain the input of the
parties regarding the proposed procedure.
8.
Arbitrator's Award and Written Opinion. After considering the
evidence submitted by the parties pursuant to these Rules, the arbitrator
will prepare a written Draft Opinion which contains the arbitrator's
findings of fact, conclusions of law, analysis of the dispute, and proposed
award. In deciding any dispute the arbitrator will endeavor to apply the
appropriate law to the dispute, including, without limitation, any applicable
statute of limitation. However, the arbitrator will not be required to follow
formal rules of evidence and can, if they deem it appropriate, consider
applicable industry norms or other matters tending to define the business
context of the dispute.
The arbitrator will serve the Draft Opinion on the parties who will,
on or before the thirtieth day following receipt of the Draft Opinion, review
and prepare briefs commenting on the Draft Opinion. Briefs will not exceed
twenty-five pages in length. Upon receipt of the parties( briefs, the
arbitrator may reopen the proceedings to obtain further information or
proceed with issuance of an award and Final Opinion. The award and the
Final Opinion may vary from the Draft Opinion and proposed award. The
Final Opinion will contain the arbitrator's findings of fact, conclusions of
law, analysis of the dispute, and award. The award will also be reported in
a document titled "Arbitrator's Award" which will state the relief granted
and the assessment of any fees or costs authorized by these Rules.
The Final Opinion and the Arbitrator's Award will be delivered by
the arbitrator to the Institute; the Institute will serve each party with a copy
of the Final Opinion and the Arbitrator's Award. The arbitrator's Final
Opinion will constitute binding precedent between the parties regarding
matters addressed by the arbitrator and, to the extent it is relevant, will be
adhered to in subsequent proceedings governing the parties' rights and
obligations under the oil and gas lease. Any Final Opinion and Arbitrator's
Awards will be binding upon the parties to the oil and gas lease and any
successors or assigns that subsequently acquire an interest in the oil and gas
lease.
Although the parties, by this Rule, are requiring the arbitrator to
issue a detailed Final Opinion, they do not intend to expand in any way
judicial review of the arbitrator's findings, conclusions, analysis, or award.
Instead, the parties intend that the arbitrator's award will be reviewable
only on the limited grounds specified in the Federal Arbitration Act. 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
9.
Arbitrator Remedies. The arbitrator is authorized to fashion any
remedy they deem appropriate under the circumstances, including specific
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performance and declaratory relief that will govern the prospective rights
and obligations of the parties under the oil and gas lease. The arbitrator has
the discretion to assess another party's attorney fees, and any other expense
associated with the arbitration process, against any other party. However,
the arbitrator does not have any authority to award exemplary or punitive
damages.
If the arbitrator determines that any party failed, in good faith, to
comply with the procedures outlined in § 4 of these Rules, the arbitrator
shall assess Institute expenses, mediator costs, and party expenses
(including travel expenses, lost work time, attorney fees, and any other loss
that the party can demonstrate arose out of the other party's failure to
participate) against the non-complying party. The parties recognize that a
failure to pursue the informal proceedings provided for by these Rules can
give rise to unnecessary expenses and loss of productivity that is difficult
to value. Nevertheless, the arbitrator will endeavor to fully compensate the
complying party to the maximum extent possible.
10. Summary Procedure. The parties authorize the arbitrator, when the
arbitrator deems the matter ripe for summary disposition, to decide the
dispute based solely upon the information contained in the Arbitration
Notice and the Arbitration Notice Reply. The parties agree that for purposes
of § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act they will be deemed to have had a
complete opportunity to present evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy by the process of filing either an Arbitration Notice or an
Arbitration Notice Reply as provided for in § 3 of these Rules. The decision
to employ this summary procedure will be in the sole discretion of the
arbitrator which the arbitrator will exercise after reviewing the content of
the Arbitration Notice and Arbitration Notice Reply(ies). In the event the
arbitrator determines the matter is not ripe for summary disposition based
upon the Notice and Reply, the arbitrator may receive additional
information from the parties and, at any subsequent time, find that the
matter is ripe for summary disposition.
11. Fees and Deposits. Upon filing an Arbitration Notice the filing party
will pay to the Institute a non-refundable filing fee of $500.
In the event the matter goes to mediation, the Institute will provide
the party filing the Arbitration Notice with the mediator's estimate of the
time required to mediate the dispute, their hourly charge, and any expenses
they anticipate. These amounts will be reflected in a Mediation Deposit
Statement prepared by the Institute which requires a deposit equal to 110
percent of the mediator's estimated total charges. The party filing the
Arbitration Notice must, on or before the tenth day following receipt of the
Mediation Deposit Statement, pay the required deposit to the Institute. In
the event the actual mediation expenses exceed the deposit, the party filing
the Arbitration Notice will be responsible for payment of the balance due
to the mediator.
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In the event the matter goes to arbitration, the Institute will provide
each party to the dispute with the arbitrator's estimate of the time required
to arbitrate the dispute, their hourly charge, and any expenses they
anticipate. These amounts will be reflected in an Arbitration Deposit
Statement prepared by the Institute which requires a deposit equal to 110
percent of the arbitrator's estimated total charges. Each party must, on or
before the tenth day following receipt of the Arbitration Deposit Statement,
remit 50 percent of the required total deposit to the Institute. In the event
the actual arbitration expenses exceed the deposit, the parties will each be
severally responsible for payment of 50 percent of the balance due to the
arbitrator. In the event there are more than two parties, or two aligned
groups of parties, then each separate party, or party group, will be
responsible for contributing their proportionate share of the required
deposit. The Institute will determine the number of party groups and party
alignment for purposes of assessing the deposit required by this section.
If the party filing an Arbitration Notice fails to pay the Filing Fee,
the arbitration proceeding will be deemed to have never been commenced.
If the party filing the Arbitration Notice fails to timely pay the amount
required by a Mediation Deposit Statement, or the amount required by an
Arbitration Deposit Statement, the arbitration proceeding will be deemed
dismissed and can be refiled only upon serving a new Arbitration Notice on
the party(ies) and paying a new Filing Fee. If the party filing an Arbitration
Notice Reply fails to timely pay their share of an Arbitration Deposit
Statement, the party filing the Arbitration Notice will be required to pay the
amount due and, regardless of who is ultimately the prevailing party in the
arbitration, and regardless of any other allocation of expenses made by the
arbitrator, will be entitled to an award of an amount equal to ten times the
amount due under the defaulting party's Arbitration Deposit Statement. In
the event the non-defaulting party fails to timely pay the amount due under
the defaulting party's Arbitration Deposit Statement, the arbitration
proceeding will be deemed dismissed.
Any unused amount held on deposit by the Institute will be
returned to the party making the deposit with a written account of amounts
received, amounts disbursed, and the balance remaining.
12. Service of Documents; Document Format. All documents required to be
served upon another party, the Institute, or the arbitrator, will be deemed
served when actually received by the addressee regardless of the means by
which they were transmitted. All documents will be on white paper
measuring 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Top, bottom, left, and right margins will
be no less than 1 inch. Type will be no smaller than 10 point type set no
more than an average of 12 characters per inch in black ink. All text will be
double-spaced; footnotes will be single-spaced and will conform to the most
recent edition of The Bluebook, A Uniform System of Citation.
13. Confidentiality; Indemnity for Institute, Mediator, and Arbitrator; Third
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Party Beneficiary Status. All information provided during the course of the
arbitration proceedings, including the negotiation and mediation phases,
and including the arbitrator's Draft Opinion and Final Opinion, will be kept
confidential by all parties involved in the process. However, the Final
Opinion in any arbitration proceeding can be used by a party in any
subsequent arbitration proceeding concerning the same oil and gas lease.
If a party is ordered by a court to reveal information covered by this section,
they will inform the court of this confidentiality obligation and seek to have
any required disclosure made in the most protective manner they can
arrange under the circumstances.
The parties agree that they will not call any mediator, arbitrator, or
member of the Institute to be a witness, or otherwise provide information
or testimony in any form, regarding any matter in any way related to the
dispute resolution proceedings contemplated by these Rules. The parties
further agree to indemnify and hold harmless any mediator, arbitrator, the
Institute, and members of the Institute, against any claim, loss, or damage,
including attorney fees and litigation expenses, and including claims based
uoon the sole or concurrent negligence of any mediator, arbitrator, the

InstiUtt. or members of the InUtt arising out of or related to the dispute
resolution proceedings contemplated by these Rules. For purposes of these
Rules, the parties intend that any mediator, arbitrator, the Institute, and
members of the Institute, are to be intended third party beneficiaries of the
parties' obligations under these Rules to include, without limitation, the
obligation to pay fees under § 11 and the obligation to indemnify and hold
harmless under this § 13.

